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Antitrust: Limiting In Pari Delicto as a
Defense to Treble Damage Actions
Plaintiffs were dealers operating muffler shops under fran-
chise agreements' granted by defendant corporation.2  They
brought a treble damage action pursuant to section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act3 charging defendants with conspiring to restrain trade
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,4 section 3 of the
Clayton Act,5 and the Robinson-Patman Act.6 The district court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment7 on the
ground that the claims were barred by the doctrine of in pari
delicto. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
first two counts and remanded the third for further consider-
ation.8 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 9 holding,
1. Among other things, the agreements prohibited dealers from
purchasing from other suppliers, fixed retail prices and restricted sales
territories.
2. The defendants included the parent corporation, three sub-
sidiaries and six individuals, officers and agents of the corporations.
International Parts was one of the subsidiary corporations.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained ....
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides:
Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared
to be illegal....
5. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) declares it unlawful for a person engaged
in commerce to condition a supply agreement on exclusiveness if the
effect of such an agreement would be to "substantially lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly ......
6. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964) forbids price discrimination between
"different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. .. ."
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (b). Counts 1 and 2 were dismissed on the
basis of the in pari delicto doctrine. An alternative ground for dis-
missal of count 1 was that no conspiracy could exist between members
of a single business entity. Count 3 was dismissed upon a finding of
no actual price discrimination or restraint of free competition.
8. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d
692 (7th Cir. 1967). The district court's reasoning was upheld on the
first two counts. Summary judgment on the third was held improper
because (1) while no price discrimination existed before signing, the
price-fixing agreements confined the dealers to the purchase of Midas
brands and (2) a potential customer betweenl franchise areas would be
willing to patronize either. The court felt that the effect of these prac-
tices on competition could not properly be ascertained by use of the
summary judgment procedure.
9. After remand, the litigants settled out of court. Plaintiffs ac-
cepted a cash offer of $490,000. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29. 1968,
at 8, col. 3.
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inter alia,10 that the doctrine of in pari delicto "with its complex
scope, contents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense
to an antitrust action."" Perma Life Mufflers, Incorporated v.
International Parts Corporation, 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
In pari delicto is a doctrine that denies recovery' 2 in either
tort or contract to an active participant in an illegal or morally
delinquent scheme. Literally translated as "in equal fault,"' 3
the doctrine has often been confused with particeps criminis,14
consent,' 5 or unclean hands.' The doctrine is based on con-
siderations of both private equity1 7 and public policy;' 8 the in-
10. The scope of this Comment will be limited to a discussion of
the doctrine of in parn delicto. The other primary issue in the case was
the defendants' assertion, upheld by the Seventh Circuit as an alterna-
tive ground for dismissal, that since the parent and subsidiary cor-
porations were commonly owned, they were entitled to cooperate with-
out creating an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument on the basis that they chose to do busi-
ness as separate entities. 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968).
11. Id. at 140.
12. "[N]o action arises ... from an illegal contract .... " 2 J.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 940 (1st ed. 1882).
13. BIAcx's LAW DICTIONARY 898 (4th ed. 1951).
14. Particeps criminis applies solely to criminal conduct. In pari
delicto invariably includes particeps criinis but the reverse is not al-
ways true. See Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 531, 23 A.2d 607
(1941).
15. Consent is the mere knowledge that persons with whom the
plaintiff is dealing are violating the antitrust laws, and is not active
participation within the meaning of in pari delicto. Note, In Par
Delicto and Consent as Defenses in P2nvate Antitrust Suits, 78 HI-Iv.
L. REV. 1241, 1247 (1965).
16. Unclean hands operates to bar recovery in much the same
manner as in par delicto but there has generally been less insistence
that the conduct be equally wrong. It is sufficient that the conduct
have some effect on the equitable relationship of the parties. See Corn-
ing Glass Works v. Anchor-Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D.
Del. 1966); Fritz v. Jungbluth, 141 Neb. 770, 4 N.W.2d 911 (1942);
Seaton v. Dye, 37 Tenn. App. 323, 263 S.W.2d 544 (1953). In pari
delicto has generally been invoked only where the parties' guilt or
wrongdoing has been approximately equal-where the delicto is par.
See Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Crown Coach Co., 178 F.2d 628
(8th Cir. 1949) (proximate cause); Furman v. Furman, 178 Misc. 582, 34
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1941); Waller v. Eanes' Adm'r, 156 Va. 389, 157 S.E. 721
(1931).
17. E.g., Middlesboro Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. Ry. 214
Ky. 822, 284 S.W. 104 (1926); De Persia v. Merchants Mut. Cas.
Co., 268 App. Div. 176, 49 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1944); Smith v. White, L.R. 1
Eq. (1866) (lessee could not recover cost of improvements from sub-
lessee when premises were used as a brothel).
18. In Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775), Lord
Mansfield, by way of dictum, stated that the defense of illegality
"sounds . . . very ill in the mouth of the defendant" but that "general
principles of policy" would occasionally al1ow the defense in furtherance
of the state's welfare. See also Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d
466 (1943); Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199 S.W.2d 146 (1947).
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dividual should not benefit from his own wrongdoing, and the
state should not be required to afford relief to one who has
violated its laws. It is one of the many "maxims" of equity that
has been assimilated into law and is currently applicable to ac-
tions which were traditionally considered either legal or equit-
able.19
The defense was first raised in a treble damage antitrust ac-
tion in federal court in 190020 and its applicability has been a
source of constant disagreement ever since. The cases have been
few enough in number and sufficiently diverse on their facts to
insure a variance of rationales.21  Early cases, 22 applying tra-
ditional rules of equity, were prone to allow the defense by
stressing the benefits plaintiff had already received from the
illegal venture and by noting the distastefulness of allowing him
further profit.23 Other courts refused to allow the defense on
public policy grounds,24 stating that the treble damage action
was intended to further the public interest in enforcement of
antitrust laws as well as to redress private injury. An addi-
tional ground for disallowing the defense has been the economic
coercion theory which recognizes that in most restrictive agree-
19. 2 J. PouERoY, EQuiTY JuRisPRuDENC . § 940 (1st ed. 1882).
20. See Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 105 F. 845, 846 (N.D.
Ill. 1900), where the court said:
There is another ground which might well be considered as
placing plaintiff without the provision of [the Sherman Act],
to wit, the fact that plaintiff was himself a party to the unlawful
combination, and was injured by reason of his illegal connection
therewith.
21. See generally Bushby, The Unknown Quantity in Private Anti-
trust Suits-The Defense of In Pari Delicto, 42 VA. L. REv. 785 (1955).
22. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1921);
Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1 (3d Cir. 1917). See
generally 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 456, 457 n.6 (1959).
23. The Blackmore court intimated a willingness to bar recovery
by any participant, stating:
It is fundamental that in the same conspiracy all partici-
pants are conspirators, whether the part they play be great
or small. They cannot receive some of the fruits and then be
held blameless for other acts which they may not have initi-
ated but whose benefits they have received.
277 F. 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1921).
24. E.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957);
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Waldron v. British
Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Trebuhs Realty Co. v.
News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In Ring v.
Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1945), the court stated as an alternate
ground for its holding:
[PJlaintiff is precisely the type of individual whom the Sher-
man Act seeks to protect from combinations fashioned by others
and offered to such individual as the only feasible method by
which he may do business. Considerations of public policy de-
mand court intervention in behalf of such a person, even if tech-
nically he could be considered in pari delicto.
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ments, one party is dominant and able to impose its terms as a
condition of doing business.25 Thus, the subordinate party-
plaintiff is not in equal fault within the meaning of the doctrine
and the defense should not be good against him.
During this early period, the Supreme Court never allowed
the doctrine to bar recovery in a civil antitrust action.26  In
Kiefer-Stewart Company v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Incor-
porated,27 the defense was before the Court under the title of
"unclean hands." There, plaintiff liquor wholesaler was allowed
to recover from manufacturers despite its participation in an
alleged illegal price-fixing arrangement with wholesalers not
party to the suit. In rejecting the defense, the Court held that
defendants were liable to parties they injured, regardless of
their relative moral culpability. The Court noted that the plain-
tiff's conduct could be deterred-even if he were allowed to re-
cover from defendant-through government action or that of
another injured private party. Some courts,28 and one commen-
tator 29 viewed Kiefer-Stewart as the demise of the defense in
federal antitrust actions. Only two years later, however, the
Fourth Circuit allowed the defense in Pennsylvania Water and
Power Company v. Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power
Company.30 Kiefer-Stewart was distinguished on the ground
25. See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945) (plaintiff signed a
restrictive theater guild agreement to save a $50,000 investment-held,
"prima facia" economic coercion); Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co.,
91 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See also 2 J. PomERoy, EQuITY JuRis-
PRUDENCE §§ 941, 942 (4th ed. 1918) and cases cited in 5 WILLsToN ON
CONTRAcT S § 1614 nn.4-7 (Rev. ed. 1937).
26. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359 (1927) has been cited as generally approving the doctrine. Crest
Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1966);
Bushby, supra note 21, at 789. But see Pennsylvania Water & Power
Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 209 F.2d 131, 134 n.2(4th Cir. 1953). But in Eastman, the jury was instructed that if the
plaintiff had entered into the agreement "knowingly and willingly"
rather than out of economic necessity, it would be in pari delicto and
could not recover. Since the jury found for plaintiff, the court did not
have to decide the applicability of the defense under other circumstances
and merely held that defendant had no cause to complain. 273 U.S. at
377-78.
27. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
28. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 184 F.2d 338 (10th Cir.
1950), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 340 U.S. 944 (1951), on remand,
190 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 902 (1952) (re-
manded in "light of Kiefer-Stewart" and plaintiff subsequently recov-
ered treble damages); Budget Dress Corp. v. International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers' Union, 25 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Mason City Tent
& Awning Co. v. Clapper, 144 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Mo. 1956); Interbor-
ough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
29. 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 619 (1953).
30. 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953).
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that the plaintiff in that action was a participant in a different
illegal combination from the one on which the suit was brought.
The court was reluctant to repudiate the long-established doc-
trine of in pan delicto without a more specific directive than
that offered by Kiefer-Stewart.31
In 1964, the Supreme Court once again disallowed the de-
fense, stressing economic coercion as the deciding factor.3 2 In
Simpson v. Union Oil Company, 3 the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit 34 and appeared to redefine coercion as a "loss of an
economic opportunity."3 5 Plaintiff's only real alternative to ac-
cepting the defendant's illegal terms was a refusal to deal at all,
in which case defendant could have found other willing retailers.
In the instant case, the Seventh Circuit 36 relied on both
Pennsylvania Water3 7 and its own prior decisions3" in distin-
guishing Kiefer-Stewart. 9 Simpson4O was not considered a man-
date to "annihilate" the doctrine of in pari delicto and the court
did not find the necessary amount of coercion to deny appli-
cation of the doctrine.41
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Black,42 dis-
agreed, relying on both Simpson and Kiefer-Stewart. The Court,
however, went beyond grounds of economic coercion. In recog-
nizing the "inappropriateness" of common law doctrines in suits
of a public nature, it noted that the treble damage action was
designed to deter anyone contemplating violation of the anti-
31. Id. at 134. See also Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Wheeling
Steel Corp., 266 F. Supp. 236 (D.N.J. 1967); Lehmann Trading Corp. v.
J. H. Stolow, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
32. The Court also mentioned public policy as an additional
ground for reversal, stating that "a consignment, no matter how lawful
it might be as a matter of private contract law, must give way before
the federal antitrust policy." Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13,
18 (1964).
33. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
34. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764 (1963).
35. Note, supra note 15, at 1246.
36. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d
692, 698 (7th Cir. 1967).
37. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec.
Light & Power Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953).
38. Florists' Nationwide Tel. Delivery Network v. Florists' Tel.
Delivery Ass'n 371 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1967); Crest Auto Supplies, Inc.
v. Ero Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1966).
39. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211 (1951).
40. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
41. 376 F.2d 692, 697-98 (1967).
42. Justice Black was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Doug-
las and Brennan. Justices White, Fortas and Marshall concurred in sep-
arate opinions and Justices Stewart and Harlan concurred and dis-
sented, preferring to remand for a proper application of in pari delicto.
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trust laws. The private equities of the parties were deemed
irrelevant since "[a] more fastidious regard for [their] relative
moral worth . .. would only result in seriously undermining
the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust
enforcement. '43
In rejecting the doctrine by name, the Court left open the
possibility of denying relief to plaintiffs in future cases on
grounds wholly apart from in pari delicto-as where plaintiff
was "actively supporting the entire restrictive program as such,
participating in its formulation and encouraging its continu-
ation. '44 Exercising judicial restraint, however, the Court chose
not to adopt any particular test and merely pointed out that the
factors present in the instant case would not be sufficient to bar
a plaintiff's suit under any new test. In reaching its con-
clusion, the Court noted that many of the restrictive clauses in
the agreement4 5 were undoubtedly detrimental to the best in-
terests of plaintiff, and thus were conditions of doing business
within the scope of the Simpson "loss of an economic oppor-
tunity" test.46 It was also deemed significant that plaintiffs
attempted, without success, to renegotiate the restrictive clauses.
It did agree, however, that the clauses inserted into the agree-
ment at plaintiff's insistence47 could be considered in computing
damages. 48
In concurring, Justice White agreed that in pari delicto
should be rejected as a defense to a treble damage action. He
went further than the majority, however, and suggested a test
by which courts could determine when plaintiff is precluded
from suing. Since section 4 of the Clayton Act requires plain-
tiff to show that defendant caused the injury complained of,40
43. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134, 139 (1968).
44. Id. at 140.
45. Among them were the closed source of supply, tying the sale
of mufflers to the sale of other products in defendants' line of parts,
and the fixed retail prices.
46. Note, supra note 15, at 1246.
47. The Court does not specifically state whether the beneficial
clauses must be inserted on plaintiff's insistence or whether they
must merely prove to benefit him. It is possible that a clause may be
insisted upon by defendant and yet benefit plaintiff-for example, an
exclusive franchise area that defendant hopes will reduce inter-franchise
strife caused by over-aggressive franchisees.
48. "The possible beneficial byproducts of a restriction from a
plaintiff's point of view can of course be taken into consideration in com-
puting damages .... " 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968).
49. "Any person who shall be injuxed . . . by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . .." 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1964); see Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
[Vol. 53:82.7
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he would deny recovery where the two parties were equally
responsible for the injury suffered by one of them.50
Justice White's opinion, together with Justice Black's, make
a majority of five willing to refute the doctrine by name. How-
ever, since White's opinion goes on to define causation as equal
fault-"where plaintiff and defendant bear substantially equal
responsibility for injury resulting to one of them"-he could also
be considered the fifth of a majority willing to deny plaintiff re-
covery where the parties are equally at fault.5 1
The most pursuasive argument that proponents of in pari
delicto have urged upon the courts is the natural abhorrence of
allowing a wrongdoer to profit from his own wrongdoing.52 The
wrongdoing plaintiff, however, will not necessarily go free since
he may open himself up to government action, treble damage
suits by parties outside the illegal scheme, or a counterclaim by
the defending party.5 3 It is also imperative to remember that
U.S. 690 (1962); Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 322
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
50. ... I would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant
bear substantially equal responsibility for injury resulting to
one of them but permit recovery in favor of the one less re-
sponsible where one is more responsible than the other.
392 U.S. 134, 146 (1968) (concurring opinion). Factors he would con-
sider in determining relative responsibility are: (1) Who originated or
implemented the scheme? (2) Who would expect to benefit from the
illegal provisions? (3) Did either party attempt to terminate the ar-
rangement? and (4) Who ultimately profited from the arrangement?
Id. at 146-47.
Justice Fortas substantially agreed with Justice White although he
would prefer to retain the defense by name and merely apply it "if the
'delicto' is approximately 'par." Id. at 147. Justice Marshall would
apply the doctrine where the plaintiff is "substantially equally at fault."
Id. at 149.
51. See the concurring opinions of Justices Fortas and Marshall and
the opinion of Justice Harlan in which Justice Stewart joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
52. See generally 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 619 (1953). In Bluefields S.S.
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1, 18 (3d Cir. 1917), the court stated
"that where a criminal combination is made . . . , the law will afford
the injured party no redress but will leave him as it finds him."
53. The Supreme Court, in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) stated:
If [plaintiffs] were guilty of infractions of the antitrust laws,
they could be held responsible in appropriate proceedings
brought against them by the Government or by injured private
persons. The alleged illegal conduct of [plaintiffs], however,
could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor
immunize them against liability to those they injured.
It could be contended that counterclaims by the defendant serve to
offset gains made by the plaintiff, thus merely wasting the courts'
time and the public's money. This argument loses its persuasiveness
once it is realized that often one party is injured much more than the




the "wrongdoing" plaintiff in most treble damage actions of this
nature is not a gigantic corporate body but an individual dealer
who has often formed a company for the sole purpose of accept-
ing the defendant's offer to do business. He has not imposed
his will on the defendant and can rarely be considered equally
at fault. It is the superior bargaining power of the party imple-
menting the scheme that is primarily responsible for the result-
ant public harm. Thus, while plaintiff's relative innocence is no
defense to suits by third parties, solely upon considerations of
deterrence, it should operate to allow him to sue as plaintiff.
It is questionable whether traditional rules of equity, form-
ulated to deal with individual litigants, should have any bearing
on actions affecting the interests of the public as a whole. 4 The
antitrust laws were intended to protect the public from harmful
restraint of trade. The private treble damage action was enacted
to further that end by assisting the Government in enforcing
the provisions of the act.55 Its inclusion not only made available
a vast army of quasi-public "prosecuters," but also threatened
stiffer penalties to the violator than. those the Government could
impose. 56  The injured parties, because of their participation,
access to financial records, and knowledge of economic conse-
quences, are in the best possible position to punish the perpe-
trator of the scheme. The Government, on the other hand, is
either politically unable or unwilling to commit the financial
or human resources required to deter the multitude of potential
antitrust violators effectively.
Any fear that Perma Life will have the effect of encouraging
a party to join an illegal scheme would be largely unfounded.
The thought of joining on a "can't lose" basis-either garnering
illegal profits or suing for treble damages-would be foreclosed
54. See Affiliated Music Enterprises v. Sesac, Inc., 160 F. Supp.
865, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (emphasis added):
It is not a question of "unclean hands" for if plaintiff had
been a victim of defendant's unlawiul practices the fact that it
had also been guilty of illegal conduct would not immunize
defendant against liability. The antitrust laws are more con-
cerned with the injury to the public than they are with the
morals of the private litigants.
55. There is little legislative history with which to determine the
specific intent of Congress with respect to the defense. However, a
case might be made for asserting that Congress did not intend the de-
fense to be allowed. See Lockhart, Violation of the Anti-trust Laws
as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 Mum. L. REv. 507, 508-09, 512-15
(1947).
56. The penalties which may be -.Imposed are: imprisonment for
up to one year and a fine of up to $50,000 or both; court order en-joining the illegal conduct; or seizure and forefeiture of property




by the difficulty and expense of antitrust litigation. In fact, the
knowledge that a prospective member of an illegal conspiracy
could subsequently turn on his fellow participants and institute a
treble damage action might tend to deter the formulation of such
conspiracies more than the threat of a suit by an outside party.
The major impact of the Court's decision should be to free
lower courts from traditional equity concepts and enable them to
formulate a test to determine when, if ever, plaintiff's partici-
pation in the illegal scheme should bar his recovery. In Perma
Life, the Court went to some length in reiterating the Simp-
son test and pointing out the elements of economic coercion.
Its reasoning suggests a misapplication of in pari deicto in anti-
trust actions rather than its total unavailability. The Court ap-
peared exasperated by the lower courts' persistent refusals to
follow the spirit of Kiefer-Stewart and Simpson, and it directed
courts in subsequent cases to focus attention on the public nature
of the treble damage action.
The desired result is to refuse recovery only when the two
conspirators are on substantially equal footing in the formulation
and promotion of the scheme. The tests offered by the various
opinions: active support of the entire restrictive program;57
delicto approximately par/;58 substantially equal fault;59 and
more substantial cause60 are all designed to reach this result.
By any test, the controlling factor should be the presence of
"power" in a business entity to impose an illegal scheme on less
powerful entities and thus to inflict economic injury on the pub-
lic. The formulation of such a test might be somewhat academic
since it is doubtful that it would ever be used to deny a plaintiff
recovery. A business entity with sufficient bargaining power
to impose its illegal scheme would hesitate to sue, since the
resultant publicity might lead to subsequent litigation with the
Government or with another private party. Such a test would
still be valuable, however, in allowing the smaller of two entities
to sue since it is not as morally responsible for the injury to the
public. The larger has the bargaining power to induce persons
in the position of the former to join in the illegal scheme. If
the smaller entity rejects participation, the larger can easily find
substitute parties. Therefore, while the smaller entity may still
be liable to third parties for its participation in the illegal
57. 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968).
58. Id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring). This is no more than a
literal application of in parn delicto, "in equal fault." BLACK'S LAW
DICTioNARY 898 (4th ed. 1951) (emphasis added).
59. 392 U.S. at 149 (Marshall, 3., concurring).
60. Id. at 144 (White, J., concurring).
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scheme, the nature of its participation should not preclude it
from suing the moving force behind the scheme.
Perhaps the most appropriate test, because of ease of appli-
cation and assurance of compliance with the mandate of anti-
trust laws, would be that of causation. Mr. Justice White's test, in
treating causation as no more than the determination of "substan-
tially equal responsibility," performs a valuable service even if he
chose the term only to denote that point where he "felt" plaintiff
should no longer recover. In parli delicto and unclean hands
are tests that are apparently more susceptible to a reversion
to "mere participation" as a ground for denial of relief. The
Court, after Kiefer-Stewart and especially Simpson, was ob-
viously unhappy with the lower courts' persistent denials of
relief to mere participants. A new test, avoiding the old terms,
should have the effect of focusing subsequent court attention on
the dominant "power" behind the scheme-the party more re-
sponsible for the resultant injury to the public.
The immediate problem under any test is the measure of
damages. One existing rule holds that the true measure of dam-
ages in an antitrust action is the amount the plaintiff could
have obtained in a legally competitive market and not the profits
he had obtained while participating in the illegal agreement. 61
A proposed rule bars recovery during the period of partici-
pation but allows it after withdrawal. 62 The reasoning under-
lying these rules is the natural reluctance to grant plaintiffs
any more than they could have obtained had they been com-
peting on an equal basis with others in their field. The injury
and, hence, the cause of action, is that the defendant's conduct
has harmed plaintiff by denying him a free and competitive
market, and not that plaintiff has failed to secure the exorbitant
profit the illegal scheme was designed to return.
Always somewhat speculative, the calculation of damages
would be further complicated if the courts were required to
measure multiple clauses in an agreement, decide which are legal
and which are not, and then determine which party is respon-
sible for each. The Court's opinion in Perma Life touches lightly
on this problem by mentioning that beneficial by-products of the
aggreement may be considered in computing damages, but two
concurring opinions dwell on the possible ramifications. Jus-
tice Fortas would deny recovery based on any clause that was
inserted into the agreement at plaintiff's insistence or for his
61. Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810 (3d Cir.
1921).
62. Note, supra note 15, at 1244.
[Vol. 53:827
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benefit. The trier of fact would have to look at who formulated
the scheme, who will benefit from the particular provision, who
suggested its inclusion, and which of the parties had the stronger
bargaining position. Justice Fortas does not specifically say that
any gains from beneficial clauses must be subtracted from losses
resulting from detrimental clauses, but such a result should be
implicit in any "offset" theory. To ignore the beneficial aspects
of plaintiff's agreement totally would tend to overburden de-
fendants and create large windfalls for plaintiffs.
Justice Marshall felt that an offset approach would over-
burden the courts with complicated factual evaluations, and is
inferior to an approach based on the parties' respective fault-
namely a proper application of in pari delicto. Thus, he would
use a moral test to deny any recovery if the parties had form-
ulated the agreement through the barter of favorable clauses,
63
regardless of the resultant economic balance.
It appears that both Justices Fortas and Marshall ignore the
central issue of antitrust damages: what did plaintiff get com-
pared to what he would have received in an open, competitive
market? The Fortas test is concerned with what plaintiff re-
ceived relative to what he gave away, and Justice Marshall is in-
fluenced by the notion that the "wrongdoer shall not benefit from
his own wrongdoing." Although Justice White does not specifi-
cally focus on the problem of damages, his causation test would
perhaps be most effective in that area. To insure compliance with
the aims and objectives of the antitrust acts, plaintiff would re-
cover for all injuries-measured in relation to the free competi-
tive market-caused by defendant. Such a test would be applied
by awarding plaintiff the difference between the amount he actu-
ally received and that which he would have received in a free,
competitive market. Clauses of the agreement beneficial to plain-
tiff would not have to be specifically evaluated since their effects
would be included in the amount plaintiff had already received
under the agreement. Thus, in a sense, the court would be "off-
setting" the beneficial aspects of the agreement. The clauses
would have to be specifically evaluated only in the event of a
suit by third parties, in order to determine which party to the
agreement was responsible for the harmful results.
63. If it could be shown that the two parties
participated in the formulation of the entire agreement, trading
off anticompetitive restraints on their own freedom of action
... for anticompetitive restraints intended for their benefit
he.. petitioners should be barred from seeking damages as to
agreement as a whole.
392 U.S. 134, 150 (1968) (concurring opinion).
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Perma Life should do much to clear up the confusion that
has surrounded the defense of in pari delicto in the antitrust
context. The rejection of the doctrine by name will serve to
focus attention away from the historical equity concept of the
defense and towards the public nature of the treble damage ac-
tion. The lower courts should now be free to concentrate their
efforts on formulating a test to determine at what point the pub-
lic interest would no longer be served by allowing the plaintiff
to recover.
The most efficient replacement test appears to be that advo-
cated by Justice White-causation. This would have the prac-
tical advantage of combining the two phases of the action-
should plaintiff recover, and if so, how much-into one question.
If defendant can be shown to have caused plaintiff's injury, he
pays only the amount attributable to his acts, leaving third
parties and the Government to offset any windfalls that might
accrue to plaintiff. In the absence of causation-as where plain-
tiff had sufficient bargaining power to have obtained the bene-
fits of the scheme legally and thus freely chose the illegal aspects
-the suit would be dismissed.
Criminal Procedure: Selecting Jury to
Determine Capital Punishment
In 1960 petitioner was convicted of murder and the jury
assessed the death penalty. Pursuart to an Illinois statute' allow-
ing jurors to be challenged for cause if they have conscientious
scruples against, or are otherwise opposed to capital punish-
ment, the prosecutor successfully challenged 47 veniremen. Of
the 47, 39 were excluded without any effort to determine
whether their feelings would invariably compel them to vote
against capital punishment. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court petitioner asserted that a jury so selected did
not represent a cross section of the community and must nec-
essarily be biased in favor of conviction. Petitioner cited
studies which concluded that juries so selected are partial
to the prosecution on the issue of guilt.2 The Court rejected
this contention stating that it could not conclude from the record
or by judicial notice that a jury so selected was more likely to
return a verdict of guilty.3 However, the Court held that the
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959).
2. 391 U.S. 510, 517 (1968).
3. Id. at 517-18.
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challenges for cause for conscientious scruples against capital
punishment had rendered the jury unrepresentative for a deter-
rnination of punishment and therefore petitioner was deprived
of the trial by jury guaranteed him under the sixth and four-
teenth amendments. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).4
Jury selection usually begins when names of persons qual-
ified to serve as jurors are compiled in accordance with appro-
priate statutes.5 From these names, the venire is selected at
random. Such selectees are then questioned at an examination
called voir dire to determine their qualifications to hear a par-
ticular case.6 Some veniremen are excused by challenges: 7 Per-
emptory challenges, although limited in number, will excuse a
venireman without cause; challenges for cause, unlimited in num-
ber, require the showing of a legally sufficient reason. Juror
opposition to capital punishment has traditionally constituted
sufficient cause for challenge. This challenge was used in early
cases where capital punishment was mandatory,s ostensibly to
exclude jurors who were so opposed to capital punishment that
they would never return a guilty verdict when that sanction
was inevitable.0 Although the mandatory death sentence has
been largely replaced by statutes allowing the jury to choose
between life imprisonment or the death penalty, the challenge
for cause has continued, producing what is referred to as a
death-qualified jury.10
Jury selection for criminal trials in federal and state courts
is limited by the sixth and fourteenth amendments.1 The Con-
4. See Witherspoon v. Illinois commentary at 21 VAND. L. REV.
864 (1968); 37 FoRD. L. REV. 129 (1968); 82 HARV. L. REV. 162 (1968);
3 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 75 (1968); 14 VL. L. REV. 125 (1968).
5. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, §§ 1, 2, 25 (1967).
6. See, e.g., id. at §§ 8, 12.
7. See, e.g., id. at § 14.
8. See, e.g., Gates v. Illinois, 14 Ill. 433 (1853).
9. In United States v. Hewson, 26 F. Cas. 303 (C.C.D.C. 1844),
Circuit Justice Story noted that the challenge for cause for conscien-
tious scruples as to a verdict of guilty in a capital case had been the
practice in that court for the last 25 years, "ever since the escape of two
of the most atrocious men ... in Rhode Island, through the scruples of
two jurymen."
10. See Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against
Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?,
39 TEx. L. REv. 545, 552 (1961).
11. Prior to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which was
decided two weeks before Witherspoon, there was no United States
constitutional guaranty to a jury trial in criminal cases in state courts.
See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965). However, Duncan
held:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fun-
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stitution has been said to require the jury to be a "body truly
representative of the community,"'1 and not the organ of any
special group or class because " [ i] n essence, the right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of
impartial, 'indifferent' jurors."'-3
Although the United States Supreme Court, prior to the in-
stant case, had never specifically addressed itself to the constitu-
tional limits on challenges for juror attitude toward capital pun-
ishment, at least two Supreme Court cases have touched on the
issue. In Logan v. United States, 4 a federal trial for conspiracy
and murder, the federal statute 5 provided that a defendant would
be tried for felonies committed in the course of a conspiracy
according to the law of the state-here Texas-where the offense
was committed. Texas law allowed the jury to choose between
the death penalty and life imprisonment. 6 At voir dire jurors
admitting to conscientious scruples against capital punishment
were excused. On appeal, the Supreme Court stated, by way of
dictum: "A juror who has conscientious scruples on any subject,
which prevent him from standing indifferent between the gov-
ernment and the accused ... is not an impartial juror."'1
Significantly, the Court adopted the reasoning of earlier de-
cisions' s where capital punishment was mandatory without in-
quiring whether a statute allowing the jury to choose between
the life or death sentence required such a challenge. 19 Stroud
v. United States20 involved the propriety of overruling a chal-
lenge for cause in the case of a juror who "made it reasonably
certain" he would vote for nothing but capital punishment in
damental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-
would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
See also 53 1hm .L. REv. 414 (1968).
12. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
13. Turner v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965). See also Fay v.
New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294-96 (1947); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 149
(1940).
14. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
15. Id. at 264 n.1.
16. Id. at 264-65 n.1.
17. Id. at 298.
18. See Gates v. Illinois, 14 Ill. 433 (853).
19. In United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 963 (1954), the court rejected the argument that change from a
statute requiring mandatory capital punishment, to a statute where
it was optional, impliedly repealed the disqualification of jurors for con-
scientious scruples against capital punishment. See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.
2d 560 (1965).
20. 251 U.S. 380 (1920).
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case of a first degree murder conviction.21 The Court held that
the challenge should have been sustained but that failure to do
so was not a prejudicial error because here the juror was ex-
cused by peremptory challenge.
The composite of Logan and Stroud suggests that persons
irrevocably committed to either form of punishment may be
properly challenged for cause. However, neither decision ad-
dressed itself to jurors between these extremes or to whether
these criteria necessarily apply to both guilt and punishment
determination.
As stated above, the Witherspoon Court rejected the defend-
ant's argument that a death-qualified jury would be conviction
prone; the Court simply held that there was insufficient sup-
port for such a contention. This same argument was made and
rejected in the California case of People v. Ray,22 a case involving
the bifurcated trial system where guilt and punishment in cap-
ital trials are determined at separate hearings.23 Because of the
bifurcated trial system the Ray case arguably provided a more
favorable climate in which to make such an argument; the guilt
issue alone could have been decided by a nondeath-qualified jury.
In spite of expert testimony in support, the appeals court af-
firmed the denial of the separate jury motion; it reasoned that
if the guilt determining jury knows that the offense may be
punished by death, persons on that jury who have conscientious
scruples against capital punishment might vote for acquittal,
even though they would not select the punishment.
In Witherspoon the Court reasoned that the jury has two
distinct responsibilities: determination of guilt or innocence
and determination of punishment. Although the Court con-
cluded that petitioner had not shown the jury biased with re-
spect to the guilt issue, "it [was] self-evident that, in its role
as arbiter of the punishment" the jury had fallen short of the
"impartiality to which petitioner was entitled under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments."24 The Court distinguished be-
tween the duty of a juror and the duty of the jury. While each
juror in a death-qualified jury could make the discretionary
judgment and thereby obey his oath, it is not possible for the
death-qualified jury, as an entity, to speak for the community
if it is composed only of members who hold the viewpoint of a
21. Id. at 381.
22. 252 Cal. App. 2d 932, 61 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1968).
24. 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968).
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"dwindling minority"25 as to punishment. In this fully retro-
active decision, the Court stated that a death sentence is not
valid if imposed by a jury chosen by excluding for cause those
with general objections to the death penalty, or those with con-
scientious or religious scruples against its use.26 Specifically,
veniremen cannot be excluded for cause because there are some
cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital punish-
ment. Nor can a prospective juror be expected to say in advance
of the trial whether he would vote for the death penalty in the
case before him. The most that can be demanded is that a
venireman be willing to consider all of the penalties provided,
and that he not be irrevocably committed before trial to vote
against the death penalty.27
Capital punishment or life imprisonment is generally
assessed without statutory or constitutional standards 28 allow-
ing for a variance in sanctions from defendant to defendant.
In the absence of any standards, such variances are not subject
to judicial review.29 The lack of standards is, of course, under-
standable, as the community split on punishment preference 30
renders legislative action difficult. However, the lack of such
substantive standards can result in. like defendants being pun-
25. Id. at 520 n.16, citing 2 PO.LLS, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW ON
PuBic OPINIoN No. 3, at 84 (1967):
It appears that, in 1966, approximately 42% of the American
public favored capital punishment for convicted murderers,
while 47% opposed it and 11% were undecided .... In 1960[year of petitioner's trial], the comparable figures were 51% in
favor, 36% opposed, and 13% undecided.
26. 391 U.S. at 522-23.
27. Id. at 522 n.21.
28. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949), the Court
approved substitution of the death penalty by the trial judge over a
jury recommendation of life imprisonment, noting that ". . . no federal
constitutional objection would have been possible ... if the judge
had sentenced him to death giving no reason at all."
29. In In re Jackson, 37 U.S.L.W. 2288 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18,
1968), the California Supreme Court, with three dissenters, rejected
the contention that the imposition of the death penalty without clear
standards constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Further, the
court determined that the fact that the sentencing jury has absolute
discretion to impose the death penalty does not constitute denial of due
process or equal protection of the law.
30. Between the first national poll on capital punishment in
April, 1936, and the most recent one in July, 1966, public ap-
proval of the death penalty has dwindled from 62 percent to 38
percent, while abolition sentiment has increased from 33 per-
cent to 47 percent.
Bedau, The Courts, The Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968




ished in an unlike manner, an objectionable result which Wither-
spoon does not alleviate.
While Witherspoon does not prescribe general substantive
punishment selection standards, it does impose standards for the
selection of the jury that determines capital punishment. Not-
withstanding that most states do accord a jury determination of
capital punishment, the rationale for these standards seems
somewhat vulnerable since there is no explicit federal constitu-
tional requirement that they do so. 3 1 Thus the Constitution de-
mands standards for a procedure it does not guaranty. Similarly,
in Turner v. Louisiana 2 the Court recognized that there was no
federal right to a jury trial, but held that if a jury trial is accorded
by the state it must meet due process standards.3 3
While the Court's basic criterion for jury selection appears
to be representativeness, it does not require that a jury in fact
be representative in order to assess the death penalty. Rather,
the Court specified that a jury cannot assess the death penalty
if it is selected in a manner which would tend to destroy repre-
sentativeness. This criterion is limited to allowing challenges
against persons who would never vote for capital punishment.3 4
The advantage of this limitation is the reduced likelihood of an
irreconcilable conflict among jurors which would inevitably
preclude jury unanimity. Justice White suggested in dissent
that the states could circumvent Witherspoon by allowing the
death penalty to be imposed by a less than unanimous verdict on
the sentence issue.35 Because there is no explicit federal guar-
anty that capital punishment be determined by a jury, a state
could presumably remove that issue from it. However, if states
allow the death penalty on a less than unanimous jury there is
still the possibility the Constitution might require unanimity
even in the absence of an explicit guaranty that capital punish-
ment be a jury determination.3 6
After the instant case, erroneous exclusion of a number of
31. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which holds that a
jury trial is guarantied under some circumstances, does not explicitly
guaranty the right to have punishment determined by a jury.
32. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
33. Id. at 471. More recently it has been held that the Constitu-
tion does in fact guaranty a jury trial in state criminal trials. Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
34. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
35. Id. at 542 n.2.
36. A unanimous jury verdict is required in sixth amendment fed-
eral trials for imposition of the death penalty. Andres v. United States,
333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948).
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prospective jurors will render a death sentence unconstitu-
tional; but what should the result be when only one or two
jurors are challenged erroneously, or on a questionable basis?
State v. Mathis,37 decided after and in consideration of the in-
stant case, states that:
erroneous exclusion of a single juror... must [not] call for a
reversal. Rather the question is whether the totality of the
trial court's treatment of the subject operated to deprive the
defendant of an opportunity for a jury of a representative
quality.38
The Mathis position seems reasonable since representation of
those opposed to capital punishment-a group involving a sub-
stantial portion of the population--could not be destroyed by a
single error. Moreover, it would allow the court greater latitude
in questioning prospective jurors, a significant factor in view of
the occasional necessity of rephrasing a question to be sure that
it is understood by the juror."9
In dissent Justice Black asserted, "If this Court is to hold
capital punishment unconstitutional, I think it should do so forth-
rightly, not by making it impossible for States to get juries
that will enforce the death penalty."40 In comparison with the
substantive content of the challenge for cause in earlier de-
cisions, Witherspoon hardly marks the giant stride denounced
by Justice Black. In People v. Bandhauer,41 the California Su-
preme Court, per Justice Traynor, suggested a standard similar
to Witherspoon allowing doubt about capital punishment pro-
viding the juror conscientiously believes that he could return a
death penalty verdict in the proper case.42 The Supreme Court
of Arizona in State v. Narten43 noted that mere opposition to
capital punishment is not cause for challenge. While the sub-
stantive content of the challenge permitted under Witherspoon
does not differ vastly from these decisions, it will restrict chal-
lenge criteria in some cases.
44
37. 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20 (1968).
38. Id. at , 245 A.2d at 27.
39. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at App. 1, Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
40. 391 U.S. at 532. For over 70 years, from 1894 to 1965 when
capital punishment was legislatively abolished, Iowa was without death
qualification of capital juries; nevertheless 39 executions took place.
Bedau, supra note 30, at 212.
41. 66 Cal. 2d 524, 426 P.2d 900, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1967).
42. Id. at 531, 426 P.2d at 905, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
43. 99 Ariz. 116, 123, 407 P.2d 81, 86 (1965).
44. See, e.g., Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 418 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) (jurors dismissed for opposition to capital punishment without
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In contrast with earlier attacks on the capacity of a death-
qualified jury to decide the issue of guilt or innocence, 5 the
instant case rests on the capacity of such a jury to decide punish-
ment properly. With respect to future trials this holding will
have substantially the same effect as a holding on the guilt
ground. This results from the fact that generally the same jury
decides both issues at a single hearing, hence a prohibition of
a death-qualified jury on the penalty issue renders moot the
theory that such juries are conviction prone. The choice of this
decisional ground in Witherspoon bears directly on its full retro-
activity. Treating this issue, the Court reasoned that jury selec-
tion procedures in the instant case undermined "the very integ-
rity of the . . .process." 46 It appears that at the time Wither-
spoon was argued, about four hundred prisoners were under
sentence of death,47 all of whom will be affected by the full
retroactivity. While judicial reconsideration of these cases will
be no small effort, it will be considerably less than that re-
quired had the decision rested on the ground that a death-
qualified jury could not properly decide the issue of guilt.48
Under Witherspoon, defendants tried for a capital offense by a
death-qualified jury, but not sentenced to capital punishment,
will not be affected.
Witherspoon can be viewed as a threshold case applying
federal constitutional standards in the area of punishment deter-
rination. A defendant's punishment in a capital case will be
determined by a jury selected pursuant to procedures with con-
stitutional safeguards. Yet, juries will still determine punish-
further questioning); Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760, 766 (D. Colo.
1968) (jurors dismissed for any conscientious scruples against capital
punishment).
45. Numerous authorities have asserted that people who believe
in capital punishment are more likely to be prosecution-prone on the
issues of guilt and penalty: F. GOLDBERG, ATTITUDE TOWARD CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT AND BEHAVIOR AS A JUROR IN SIVULATED CAPITAL CASES (portions
reproduced in Petitioner's Brief, app. 66-68); W. WILSON, BELIEF n CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT AND JURY PERFORMANCE (portions reproduced in Peti-
tioner's Brief, app. 60-66); Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for
Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on
Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEX. L. REv. 545 (1961). But see, Osser and Bernstein,
Death Oriented Jury Shall Live, 1 U. SAN FERN. VAL. L. REv. 210 (1968).
46. 391 U.S. at 523 n.22.
47. NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, EXECUTIONS, 1966, Figure D., at 4
(reproduced in Reply Brief of Amici Curiae, American Friends Service
Committee, et al., at 6). Bedau, supra, note 30, at 223 n.93: "A group
called 'Californians Against Legal Murder' reports in its newsletter (May
1968) that a total of 472 persons are currently under sentence of death in
the United States."
48. See note 29 supra.
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ment without the benefit of any substantive standards. In the
future, assessment of capital punishment without the use of such
standards by either a judge or a jury may also become subject
to constitutional challenge.
Evidence: Hearsay Exception in Civil Action
Against State for Testimony by State
Witness in Prior Criminal Action
Plaintiff was accosted by a trio of teenage boys, one of whom
shot him in the head, causing total blindness. The youth who
fired the shot was a parolee who had not been expeditiously
arrested after a prior violation of his parole conditions. Plain-
tiff brought suit against the State of New York' for negligence
in dealing with an incorrigible. The boy testified for the state
at the criminal trial of his two companions as to the identity of
the assault weapon and how he had obtained it. Later the youth
was sent to a reformatory where he was murdered before plain-
tiff commenced the present action. The parolee's testimony at
the prior criminal trial was admitted over a hearsay objection
and recovery was granted.2 Wasserstein v. New York, 56 Misc.
2d 225, 288 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
Many different definitions of the hearsay rule have been
advanced.3  Perhaps the broadest states that testimony, oral or
1. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 8 (McKinney 1963):
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action
and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same
determined in accordance with the same rules of law as ap-
plied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or
corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limita-
tions of this article.
Section 9 provides that "[T]he court shall have jurisdiction: . . . (2) To
hear and determine a claim of any person ... against the state ... for
the torts of its ... employees while acting as such .... "
2. An interesting question raised by the case but not discussed in
this Comment is the court's view of proximate cause. Only three days
elapsed between the youth's parole violation and his arrest. In the
interim he caused the injury to plaintiff. The court does not explain
its view that three days is an unreasonably long delay, or attempt to
show that the state had the opportunity to act sooner.
3. See, e.g., Meyst v. East Fifth Ave. Serv. Inc., 401 P.2d 430
(Alas. 1965); Northern Trust Co. v. Moscatelli, 54 li. App. 2d 316, 203
N.E.2d 447 (1964); Gass v. Carducci, 37 Ill. App. 2d 181, 185 N.E.2d
285 (1962); Stevenson v. Abbott, 251 Icwa 110, 99 N.W.2d 429 (1959);
In re Earle, 355 Mich. 596, 95 N.W.2d 883 (1959). See also 5 J. WIGMORE,
EviDENcE §§ 1360-94 (3d ed. 1940).
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written,4 can not be admitted if its credibility depends upon
some person other than the testifying witness.5 While many
reasons have been advanced in support of the rule,6 its basic
purpose is to protect the party against whom the hearsay is
offered;7 this is done by shielding him from statements of per-
sons, not subject to cross-examination, s whose demeanor can-
not be observed by the trier of fact.9
The right of cross-examination is basic to the adversary sys-
tem, which is founded on the notion that only through the pres-
entation of both sides can truth be uncovered.10 The adversary
system presumes that direct examination alone does not produce
all the facts within a witness' knowledge.11 More important, how-
ever, cross-examination serves the function of casting doubt on
the credibility of a person's testimony.12 Thus, cross-exami-
4. See Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958); In re Estate of Plumb, 256
Iowa 938, 129 N.W.2d 630 (1964).
5. See, e.g., Shinn v. Francis, 404 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1965); Williams
v. Morris, 200 Va. 413, 105 S.E.2d 829 (1958). Compare 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 3, with C. McCoRmcx, EvmwcEN § 225 (1954) and Wheaton,
What is Hearsay?, 46 IowA L. Rsv. 210 (1961).
6. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) (no
opportunity to observe demeanor); Rossville Salvage Corp. v. S.E.
Graham Co., 319 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1963) (witness not under oath and
not subject to cross-examination); NLRB v. Imparato Stevedoring Corp.,
250 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1957) (testimony not subject to cross-examination);
United States v. National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1961)
(party against whom statement is made has no opportunity to confront
the person making it); Miami v. Fletcher, 167 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1964) (prevents unreliable testimony). See also Wheaton,
supra note 5. The validity of a number of these reasons has been
questioned. See 5 J. WiGMoPE, supra note 3, at § 1363.
7. United States v. National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.
Ind. 1961). See generally Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177 (1948).
8. E.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286
F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Imparato Stevedoring Corp., 250 F.2d
297 (3d Cir. 1957); Buchanan v. Nye, 128 Cal. App. 2d 582, 275 P.2d 767
(1954); Baker v. Atkins, 258 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953). See also
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at § 1362.
9. See In re Estate of Lagersen, 169 Cal. App. 2d 359, 337 P.2d
102 (1959).
10. E.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); In re Estate of
Lagersen, 169 Cal. App. 2d 359, 337 P.2d 102 (1959); People v. Aragon,
154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957).
11. In re Estate of Lagersen, 169 Cal. App. 2d 359, 337 P.2d 102
(1959).
12. Traditionally, there have been six main lines of attack on the
credibility of a witness by means of cross-examination. They are:
(1) proof that the witness has made prior statements inconsistent with
his present testimony; (2) specific contradiction; (3) proof that the wit-
ness is biased by reason of emotional influences or pecuniary reasons;
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nation is considered essential whether or not the evidence in
question is hearsay.13 The lack of opportunity to discover addi-
tional qualifying testimony and to cast doubt on the speaker's
reliability increases the danger of admitting half-truths or out-
right lies into evidence.
The hearsay rule, however, has become riddled with ex-
ceptions, 14 and some suggestion has been made that it is of little
value as it exists today.15 Underlying most of the exceptions
are two factors: the necessity of using the evidence in hearsay
form and its reliability.'6 To fulfill the requirement of relia-
bility, the courts usually insist that something in the evidence
act as a substitute for cross-examination.' 7 For example, s of-
ficial reports compiled in the line of duty and open to public
scrutiny have been admitted by some courts on the theory that
public officials are presumed to take their responsibilities
seriously and the availability of public evaluation is equivalent
to cross-examination. 9
The courts have consistently held that records of other ju-
dicial proceedings are inadmissible hearsay unless they fall within
an exception to the rule.20  While it is true that a prior judg-
(4) attack on the character of the witness; (5) proof of a defect in the
witness' sensory or mental capacity; and (6) proof of a lack of religious
belief, which casts doubt on the effect of the oath. This last ground
no longer carries weight. See C. McComiRcK, CASES ON EVIDENCE 72
(3d ed. 1956).
13. E.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); In re Estate of
Lagersen, 169 Cal. App. 2d 359, 337 P.2d 102 (1959); People v. Aragon,
154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957).
14. E.g., Ohio Associated Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 664 (6th Cir.
1951) (hearsay admitted to show information on which person acted);
Williams Bros. Grocery Co. v. Blanton, 105 Ga. App. 314, 124 S.E.2d
479 (1962) (admission of evidence to explain conduct); State v. Schaller,
111 Ind. App. 128, 40 N.E.2d 976 (1942) (pedigree evidence by family
member); Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 155 N.E. 88 (1926) (state-
ment against own interest); Mercep v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n,
167 Ore. 460, 118 P.2d 1061 (1941) (dying declaration allowed by statute).
15. See Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Fu-
tile Search for Paradise, 54 A.B.A.J. 231, 235 (1968).
16. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at §§ 1421-22.
17. See Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140 (1955),
citing 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at § 1422.
18. E.g., In re Estate of Monticelli, 107 Cal. App. 2d 90, 236 P.2d
661 (1951) (statements of family history by family member viewed as
trustworthy); Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945)
(statements against own interest not likely to be false); People v.
Kraft, 148 N.Y. 631, 43 N.E. 80 (1896) (solemnity of dying declaration).
19. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, 240 F. 903
(3d Cir. 1917); Fauceglia v. Harry, 409 Pa. 155, 185 A.2d 598 (1962);
Rex v. Aickles, 1 Leach 435, 168 Eng. Rep. 321 (1 Cr. Cas. Res. 1785).
20. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at § 1388.
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ment between the same parties on the same issues has a res
judicata effect,21 the situation is obviously different when the
parties change.22 Accordingly, the courts have held that before
prior testimony can be admitted under an exception to the hear-
say rule, there must be an identity of parties and issues.23 In
addition, as with other exceptions to the rule, prior testimony
will not be allowed into evidence unless a showing of necessity
can be made.
The cases in this area have followed two lines of authority.
The minority rule, as expressed in Mclnturff v. Insurance Com-
pany of North America,24 is that the parties must remain exactly
the same. The court felt that to hold otherwise would expand
the principle to a dangerous extreme and result in consequences
which the court could not sanction.25 The majority rule, on the
other hand, does not require a precise identity of parties, but only
that the party against whom the evidence is used was also the
party against whom it was used at the earlier trial. 26 The rea-
soning behind this approach is that as long as the issues remain
substantially the same, the party will have had meaningful
opportunity to cross-examine at the earlier trial, and his interests
will have been protected.
21. The Minnesota rule as stated in Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn.
515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964), is different. That case held that a stranger to
the first action can invoke the doctrine of estoppel by verdict against an
adversary who appears in identical capacities in both suits. Conse-
quently, it would be illogical to require that the prior testimony ex-
ception in Minnesota should have stricter mutuality of parties require-
ments than estoppel by verdict.
22. See C. McCoRmc, supra note 5, at § 295:
The judgments of the courts determining issues of fact, though
they are in some sense the reports of the findings of official
investigations, have not been received as a general practice as
evidence in other suits of the facts so found. Their use in
court has been guided by a different principle, that of res judi-
cata, and in consequence the findings are received only where
the parties to the earlier suit are the same as in the present, or
where the present parties are claiming under them....
23. See Bartlett v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S.W.
2d 740 (1942); Feldstein v. Harrington, 4 Wis. 2d 380, 90 N.W.2d 566
(1958).
24. 248 fll. 92, 93 N.E. 369 (1910).
25. Id. at 98, 93 N.E. at 371:
m . . in an action against a carrier by a passenger for a personal
injury the testimony of a witness since deceased would be ad-
missible against the same carrier for an injury sustained in the
same accident by another passenger, . . . simply because the
carrier against whom the testimony was offered had on the
former trial an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
26. See Bartlett v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 160 S.W.
2d 740 (1942); State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256 (1939).
1969]
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In the Wasserstein case, the court allowed into evidence
portions of the trial transcript from the criminal trial of the
parolee's two associates. At that trial, the parolee had testified
as to ownership of the assault weapon and how he had obtained
possession of it. The court based its decision to admit the record
of this testimony on what it felt was the liberal policy behind
the prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule as expressed
by the New York legislature. The statute states:
if a witness' testimony is not available because of . . .
death, . . . his testimony . . . may be introduced in evidence
by any party upon any trial of the same subject-matter in ...
another action between the same parties or their represen-
tatives ... 27
While the parties in the second action changed, the court equated
the interests of the parolee at the earlier criminal trial to the
state's interest in the later civil action brought by Wasserstein.28
The judge pointed out that both cases were concerned with
the same act and that the parolee was represented by counsel
and was afforded the right to cross-examine.29 In addition, the
Wasserstein court recognized that strict application of the hear-
say rule is breaking down, and that disallowance of the prior
testimony would only hamper the search for truth.30 The court
professed to follow a trend expressed in Fleury v. Edwards31
that exceptions to the hearsay rule are being expanded in scope
to meet the needs of modern litigation.32 The judge in Wasser-
stein felt this policy should be continued, and that a reasonable
interpretation of the prior testimony exception justified admis-
sion of the parolee's former statements.
In reaching this conclusion, the Wasserstein court loosely
applied the requirements of the exception. In enacting the stat-
ute, the legislature felt that to forbid the use of such prior testi-
mony would seriously endanger the administration of justice in
27. N.Y. Civ. PR~c. LAW RuLE 4517 (McKinney ed. 1963) (emphasis
added).
28. The court would have a better argument f it equated the in-
terest of the defendants at the criminal trial and the state in the civil
action, for it is not at all clear why the interest of the parolee, who
was not on trial, was similar to that of the state at the second trial.
29. 56 Misc. 225, 228, 288 N.Y.S.2d 274, 278 (1968).
30. Id. at 228, 277.
31. 14 N.Y.2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1964).
32. Id. at 341, 200 N.E.2d at 554, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 653:
The common law of evidence is constantly being refashioned by
the courts of this and other jurisdictions to meet the demands
of modern litigation. Exceptions to the hearsay rules are being
broadened and created where necessary .... Absent some
strong public policy or a clear act of pre-emption by the Legis-
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certain cases.3 3 While almost no one would argue with the policy
expressed by the legislature3 4 and Fluery v. Edwards,3 5 the
Wasserstein court may have extended the exception far beyond
its intended scope by losing sight of the requirements established
by the statute.
The statute appears to be a codification of the common law
prior testimony exception, and seems to require the strict iden-
tity of parties necessary under the minority rule. This identity
was not present in Wasserstein. Although the plaintiff was in no
way a party to the earlier criminal trial, the court believed his
interest was identical to that of the state at the earlier trial. The
state, although a party to the first action, found itself in an
enirely different role in the present case. In the criminal trial
the state was prosecutor, and as such, its task was quite different
from that of defendant in the later civil suit. The court relied
on the fact that the parolee in the earlier action was represented
by counsel and was afforded a right to cross-examine. Appar-
ently, the court believed the state's interest in the Wasserstein
case was identical to the parolee's interest in the criminal action.
Thus, the court must have thought that the parolee's counsel
represented the state's interest at the earlier trial.
By straining to find a correlation of interests, the court
ignored a better reason for admitting the testimony-that it was
originally offered by the state, which in a sense vouched for its
reliability. If the state, as the introducing party, had any qualms
about the credibility of the testimony, it could have chosen not
to introduce it. Thus, the state, in the later civil action, should
not be allowed to complain that it did not have an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness.3 6
By adopting a correlation-of-interests test, the Wasserstein
court created an unnecessary and indefinite rationale for admit-
ting prior testimony. It effectively eliminated the prior testi-
mony exception's identity-of-parties requirement, opening the
way for admitting prior testimony against a party who neither
lature, rules of evidence should be fashioned to further, not
frustrate, the truth-finding function of the courts in civil cases.
33. See J. WEmSTEI, H. KoIN, & A. MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL
PRACTICE 1 4517.24 (1965) [hereinafter cited as WENSTEIN].
34. Id. 1 4517.12.
35. 14 N.Y.2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1964).
36. The only instance in which it could not be said that the state
had vouched for the reliability of the testimony would be where the
witness changed his story on the stand, and in such a case the state
could claim surprise and cross-examine its own witness. See People v.
Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733 (1916).
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introduced nor had an opportunity to cross-examine the testi-
mony at the earlier proceeding. Suppose, for example, that the
state had sought to introduce against Wasserstein certain dam-
aging testimony which had been offered by the defendants in the
earlier criminal proceeding. As long as the witness is unavail-
able, it seems that the testimony would be admissible if one
accepts the court's rationale. The state's interest at the criminal
proceeding was to prove that the defendants had assaulted and
robbed Wasserstein, and Wasserstein's interest in the civil action
was to prove that the delinquent parolee and the defendants
assaulted and robbed him. Thus, it seems that the Wasserstein
court would hold that the interests of the state and Wasserstein
were sufficiently similar to support a finding that the state's
cross-examination at the earlier criminal action had protected
Wasserstein's interests. It should be noted that the better reason
for the result of the case at bar would not apply to many logical
extentions of the court's rationale.
By stretching an intelligently liberal doctrine, the Wasser-
stein court lost sight of the intention of the hearsay rule. As
expressed above, the primary reasons for excluding hearsay testi-
mony are its immunity from cross-examination"7 and its conse-
quent lack of reliability.38 Even the common law's prior testi-
mony exception recognized as essential the right to a prior cross-
examination.39 This should not mean cross-examination by some
third party at an earlier trial, but by the person against whom
the testimony is being offered.40
Although strict application of the hearsay rule is often un-
just, and the flexible policy expressed in Fluery is desirable, the
rule is not without merit. While some would abolish the rule
completely,41 the New York legislature felt it desirable to lib-
37. See, e.g., Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,
286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Imparato Stevedoring Corp., 250
F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1957); Buchanan v. Nye, 128 Cal. App. 2d 582, 275
P.2d 767 (1954); Baker v. Atkins, 258 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
38. Atwood v. Atwood, 86 Conn. 579, 86 A. 29 (1913).
39. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lagersen, 169 Cal. App. 2d 359, 337
P.2d 102 (1959).
40. See WEiNsTEnv at ff 4517.28:
Prior testimony given without opportunity to cross-examine is
not made admissible by CPLR 4517, since "the examination of a
witness consists not alone of the direct, but also of the cross,
and a party cannot be deprived of the right to cross-examine
his adversary's witness.
41. See Smith, supra note 15, at 235:
Any rule, I submit, requiring thirty-two exceptions to explain
its operation is not a rule at all but a nonexistent Eudoxian
universe. The idea behind the hearsay rule is valid enough, and
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eralize it by placing more discretion in the courts to admit hear-
say of probative value.42 The statute sought to change the rule
from an absolute to a flexible one whose boundaries were to be
sketched according to already existing exceptions.43
The confusion evidenced by Wasserstein underscores the
need for clarification of the rule and its exceptions. The courts
should concentrate more on adherence to the policy behind the
rule than on its strict application. If the hearsay does not really
prejudice one side's right to cross-examination, if it is reasonably
reliable and if a necessity for using the testimony in that form
exists, then there is little reason why it should be excluded. If
these characteristics are absent, then admission of hearsay vio-
lates the fundamental tenets of our judicial system.
Free Press: Newspaper Discretion to Refuse
Advertising in Monopoly Situation
The only daily newspaper in town refused to accept the
advertisements of a theater which showed "adult" motion pic-
tures. The theater owner, contending compliance with the law
and all reasonable rules of the newspaper as to the character
of its advertising, sought damages and an order compelling publi-
cation of his ads. Defendant newspaper's motion for summary
judgment was granted by the trial court and upheld by the
Michigan Court of Appeals.' In affirming, the Michigan Su-
preme Court, one Justice dissenting, held that the business of
publishing a newspaper is a strictly private enterprise and the
publisher thereof is under no legal obligation to sell advertising'
we shall reach it in due course, but the idea is not best expressed
or applied as a rule or as a series of rules, each with its excep-
tions, and exceptions to the exceptions.
42. See WEINsTEm at 4517.23:
Much wider discretion should be vouchsafed the court to admit
hearsay of high and assessable probative force. Exercise of dis-
cretion rather than mechanical rules requires more thought and
consideration of such factors as surprise, possible prejudice
through over-estimation of ... other evidence more easily
assessed.
43. See also WEmsrsni at 1 4517.23:
Excessively detailed exceptions of the present rule will become
guidelines for the exercise of discretion. What is here suggested
is not abolition of the hearsay rule but its conversion .. from
a rule of exclusion to one of discretion ....




to all who would buy it. Bloss v. Federated Publications, In-
corporated, 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968).
It is well established that a person engaged in a private
enterprise may refuse to deal with another without offering
justification,2 unless the refusal is part of a concerted restraint
of trade3 or in furtherance of an illegal monopoly.4 However,
one engaged in a business commonly characterized as a public
utility has a duty to serve without discrimination and on proper
terms all who request his service.5
At common law the businessmen considered to be engaged
in public activity included operators of grist mills, proprieters of
inns, wharfingers, and those engaged in common carriage, such
as ferrymen and cabmen.6 Since then, American courts have
permitted legislatures to add a wide variety of enterprises to this
list of businesses obligated to serve without discrimination.7 The
2. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 762 (19.19):
One who causes intended or unintended harm to another merely
by refusing to enter into a business relation with the other or to
continue a business relation terminable at his will is not liable
for that harm ...
3. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 765 (1939). For a discussion of the
problems which newspapers might encounter in censoring advertising
on the advice of another organization see Baum, Self Regulation and
Antitrust: Suppression of Deceptive Advertising by the Publishing
Media, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 289 (1961).
4. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 764 (1.939). For a case applying the
Sherman Act to the newspaper industry see Lorain Journal v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
5. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 763 (1939).
6. For a discussion of some of the theories which have been ad-
vanced to explain the origins of the public utility concept, see F. HALL,
THE CONCEPT OF A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST 7-16
(1940) [hereinafter cited as HALL].
7. Among the businesses which have been placed in either the
public utility or common carrier category are railroads, motor buses and
trucks, telephone and telegraph systems, suppliers of gas, electricity,
steam and water, warehouses, stockyards, grain elevators, and cotton
gins. HALL at 17-55.
The terms "public utility" and "common carrier" refer to businesses
which are invariably obligated to serve without discrimination. Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923).
A business "affected with a public interest" is a broader term which
includes public utilities and common carriers as well as businesses
which might only be subjected to less extensive economic regulation
such as licensing requirements and price controls. If a business af-
fected with the public interest holds itself out to serve the public, then
the courts might say it is operating as a public utility or common carrier.
HALL, 101-03.
The reason for the extension of the number of enterprises consid-
ered public is that at one time it was thought that certain forms of
legislative regulation could not be imposed on businesses unless that
business was "affected with the public interest." E.g., Tyson & Bro.
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most important factors considered by the courts in determining
the public nature of an enterprise include the degree of monopoly
in the industry, whether the industry holds itself out to serve
the public indiscriminately, the public necessity for the enter-
prise and whether the state has granted to the concern powers
of eminent domain or special use of roads.8
If a business is neither declared a public utility by the legis-
lature, nor so classified at common law, there is some question
as to whether a court may declare the business public. Although
the general rule has precluded the courts from such declarations
in the absence of the legislative enactment,9 American courts, on
their own initiative, have occasionally placed new businesses in
the public category.'0 The judicial rationale used to justify such
action is that a business does not become public because the
legislature has impressed the public interest upon it, but rather
because the very characteristics of the business render it in-
herently public."
However, only two cases have clearly held that courts may
take complete initiative in including enterprises in the public
v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927). However, the use of this concept as the
test of the constitutional validity of such legislation has been dis-
avowed by the Supreme Court and replaced with notions of due proc-
ess. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). For this reason the
concept of a business "affected with the public interest" has lost most
of its original significance.
8. See HALL. at 90-145 for an analysis of the weight which the
courts have given these and other factors.
9. Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880);
cf. State ex rel. Star Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60
S.W. 91 (1901). The reason for the rule is that:
apart from the consideration that the extension and application
of even existing rules of law to subjects not heretofore within
their [the courts'] purview is legislative in its nature, the de-
termination by the courts as to the precise point at which a
mere private business reaches that stage of growth and expan-
sion which is sufficient to render it juris publici would be
surrounded with very great difficulties, and would present
questions for which the courts, unaided by legislation, would
be able to find no just or satisfactory criterion or test. But
when the legislature, acting upon a competent state of facts,
has interposed and declared the business to be juris publici, all
difficulty is removed.
American Live-stock Comm'n Co. v. Chicago Live-stock Exch., 143 IMI.
210, 238-39, 32 N.E. 274, 282 (1892).
10. HALL at 90; Y. SmITH, N. DOWLING & R. HALE, CASES ON THE
LAW OF PuBLic UTmITIs 6 (1936).
11. McCarter v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 372, 379, 73 A. 80
83 (1909). It should be noted, however, that the rationale expressed by
this case predated Nebbia, which replaced inquiries into the abstract




utility category. 12 Other opinions often cited in support of the
proposition are not conclusive as they appear influenced by
such factors as the "spirit" of a legislative enactment, 3 the
existence of legislation which already extensively regulated the
business,14 a charter provision in which the state had granted
the business powers of eminent domain 15 or the fact that the
industry grew out of new technology and closely resembled the
historic common carrier. 6
As for the newspaper industry, the courts generally have
not interfered with the publisher's right to reject material which
he does not wish to publish. Newspapers are not required to
publish delinquent tax lists'7 or other public proceedings.' 8
Similarly, newspapers may refuse publication of legal notices, re-
gardless of motive, even though a statute requires publication in
a particular town with only one newspaper. 19 Statutes imposing
a penalty on newspapers for refusal to accept certain advertise-
ments have been held invalid as an impairment of the right to
12. New York & Chicago Grain & Stock Exch. v. Chicago Bd. of
Trade, 127 f11. 153, 19 N.E. 855 (1889); Uhlnan v. Sherman, 22 Ohio
WN.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (1919). But cf. American Live-stock
Comm'n Co. v. Chicago Live-stock Exch., 143 Ill. 210, 32 N.E. 274 (1892),
in which the court held that the mere fact that the livestock market,
which was owned by a private corporation, had become so large as to
influence the commerce of a large section of the country, does not give
the courts power to declare the market hnpressed with a public interest.
The court said only the legislature had that power. Stock Exchange
was distinguished on the ground that in that case the Board of Trade
had for several years devoted its service to the public use and supplied
market quotations to all members of the public who desired to obtain
them and thereby caused the public to rely on the service.
13. Tallassee Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Holloway, 200 Ala. 492, 76 So.
434 (1917) (imposition on a cotton gin of a duty to serve without dis-
crimination held to be within the spirit of legislation prohibiting price
discrimination between customers who sell and those who do not sell cot-
ton to the ginnery).
14. Nash v. Page, 80 Ky. 539, 44 Am. :Rep. 490 (1882).
15. Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56
N.E. 822 (1900); cf. State ex rel. Star Publishing Co. v. Associated Press,
159 Mo. 410, 60 S.W. 91 (1901) (obligation not imposed when business
had no power of eminent domain).
16. State ex rel. Webster v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 17 Neb. 126, 22 N.W.
237 (1885) (telephone company is a common carrier of news, the same
as a telegraph company).
17. Lake County v. Lake County Publishing & Printing Co., 280 In.
243, 117 N.E. 452 (1917).
18. Belleville Advocate Printing Co. v. St. Clair County, 336 Ill.
359, 168 N.E. 312 (1929); Wooster v. Mahaska County, 122 Iowa 300, 98
N.W. 103 (1904).
19. Mack v. Costello, 32 S.D. 511, 143 N.W. 950 (1913).
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contract.20 With the exception of an Ohio lower court decision,2 1
the argument that newspapers, in some respects, ought to be
considered public has been uniformly rejected and courts have
refused to impose liability for refusal to deal with certain ad-
vertisers.22  Three reasons have been advanced in support of
these decisions: First, the newspaper does not resemble other
businesses which have been found to be public utilities;2 3 second,
the legislature, not the courts, is responsible for declaring a busi-
ness a public utility;24 and third, imposition of a duty to serve
all advertisers violates the first amendment.2 5
The Bloss court was content to rest its decision on the over-
whelming weight of authority cited by the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals,20 without undertaking to re-examine the issues. There-
fore, it is necessary to analyze Bloss in the context or reasons
given elsewhere in support of the proposition that newspapers are
not of a public nature, which would preclude their refusal of any
advertising they choose, regardless of motive.
Because of the above discussed tendency to view the prob-
lem as merely placing a newspaper in its appropriate category,
either private or public, the opinions fail to isolate those in-
stances in which a newspaper's refusal to deal with advertisers
has particular effect on the public interest and which might
justify an application of the public utility theory to certain as-
pects of newspaper advertising. To ask whether the business is
20. Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144
N.E. 400 (1924).
21. Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54
(1919).
22. In. re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931); Approved
Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1965); Shuck v. Car-
roll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933); Friedenberg v.
Times Publishing Co., 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930); J.J. Gordon, Inc. v.
Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586(1961); Poughkeepsie Buying Serv., Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers,
Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1954); cf. Mid-West Elec. Co-op,
Inc. v. West Texas Chamber of Commerce, 369 S.W.2d 842 (1963).
23. See cases cited note 22 supra.
24. In re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931); Approved
Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1965); Friedenberg
v. Times Publishing Co., 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930); Poughkeepsie
Buying Serv., Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 131
N.Y.S.2d 515 (1954).
25. Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla.
1965); Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813
(1933); J.J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343
Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961).




public or private, without evaluating the interests at stake,
clearly begs the question.27
The public has a strong interest in preserving its access to
information concerning competing goods and services. In the
case of political advertising, a daily newspaper can be particularly
crucial to the public, as well as the candidate.28  On the other
hand, since this same power can be used to protect the consumer
from misleading advertisements and harmful or inferior prod-
ucts, some rights to refusal perhaps should be preserved. Also,
there is an interest in the quality and style of the advertising
published.
It is common practice for newspaper publishers to exercise a
degree of censorship over the types of products advertised and the
content of the ads presented in order to shield the unwary con-
sumer and protect the public health and morals. 29 These cen-
sorship practices, usually based on the legitimate desire to main-
tain reader confidence in the reliability of its advertisers and in
the reputation of the publication itself, often represent busi-
ness judgments in addition to satisfying the newspaper's sense
of social obligation. These above considerations suggest the
difficulty in conclusively demonstrating that public interest de-
mands categorizing newspaper advertising as a public utility. 0
27. The concept that certain businesses are public has no sig-
nificance in the abstract. Its only significance arises from the
notion that the state has a special interest in controlling or regu-
lating certain businesses and imposing upon them certain obli-
gations....
HALL at 7.
28. According to one advertising executive:
Daily newspapers enjoy a unique advantage that enables them
to usually receive more of the political advertising dollar than
any other medium. This advantage is time. When money rolls
in in large volume at the end of a campaign, when hysteria is
at its height, there does not remain enough time to pick and
choose among media. Television schedules are full. Radio
stations can't squeeze in a desirable minute on already over-
loaded schedules. Billboard printing takes ten days and
scheduling is done months in advance. Even the weekly news-
papers must be serviced a week before runnings, and they come
out on Thursdays. Elections are on Tuesdays, so this means
about a two-week lag from preparation to pre-election pub-
lication. But the daily newspaper, the large metropolitan dailies,
will run any amount of advertising as if it had been in their
hands for weeks instead of hours. This accounts for the pre-
ponderance of final-week newspaper advertising.
M. McCAFFREY, ADVERTISING WiNs ELECTIONS 126-27 (1962).
29. For detailed examples of the censorship policies of several
leading newspapers, see F. THAyEm, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PREss 652-67
(1962).
30. But for an argument in support of a broad right of access to
the press, see Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HAIv. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
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The second reason advanced for allowing newspaper refusal
to undesired advertising is that the legislatures, not the courts,
are responsible for declaring a business impressed with the pub-
lic interest.31 In making this assertion, the judiciary fails to dis-
cuss those cases in which the courts appear to have imposed such
an interest in the absence of legislation.32 Nevertheless, to allow
the courts the initiative in the regulation of newspaper adver-
tising would seem to allow a greater degree of judicial initiative
than previously exercised.33 None of the mass media have his-
torically been regarded as common carriers and here there are
no special circumstances, such as extensive and related pre-exist-
ing legislative control of newspaper advertising policy, nor the
granting of special state powers, such as eminent domain, to
newspapers. Nor would this case seem to come under the rule
that emerged from two old Illinois cases which appeared to permit
judicial initiative in those circumstances in which the public has
come to rely heavily on the service of the business in question.3 4
It is not sufficient that a business affects the public interest be-
cause of its control over a large market-it must affirmatively
create and devote an interest to the public.35 Thus, only if
the court in Bloss chose to ignore the factual circumstances of
those cases in which courts have imposed a duty to serve,
without express legislative authority, would there be precedent
to support the imposition of such a duty on newspaper publish-
ers.
Moreover, the justification for allowing judicial initiative in
this case appears especially weak when one considers the reason
for deferring such judgments to the legislature. Presumably the
legislature is in a superior position to determine where the pub-
lic interest lies and to fashion a regulatory scheme accordingly.
The formulation of consistent standards for the implementation
of a right of access beyond the prevention of the more arbitrary
abuses of monopoly power would be quite difficult, especially in
light of the case-by-case process.36
However, the outline of these standards is perhaps not as
difficult. In order to accomodate the reasonable economic, pro-
fessional and social interests of the publisher as well as the in-
31. See cases cited note 23 supra.
32. See notes 10-16 supra, and accompanying text.
33. Id.
34. See note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
35. See note 12 supra.
36. See COMMISSION ON =Hx FREEDOM OF THE PREss, GovERaWNENT
AND MAss COMMUNCATIONS 624-50 (1947).
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terests of the consumer it has been recognized that, even under
the public utility theory, publishers should be allowed to develop
their own individual classification system.37 Under such a sys-
tem they can reject advertisements for specific classes of prod-
ucts and retain the right to insist upon certain standards of
truthfulness and taste. This system permits the publisher to
exclude products which either he or his readers might consider
socially undesirable, such as liquor, firearms or certain drugs,
without upsetting the competitive balance among merchants of
those products. However, finer distinctions might have to be
drawn. As in the instant case, is it a reasonable classification to
accept advertisements of movies in general but to decline ads for
"adult" movies? It can be questioned whether, at this point, the
courts are competent to make a decision without a clear con-
ception of what the public desiresas
The third reason advanced in support of allowing news-
papers the right of refusal is that to do otherwise would violate
the publisher's first amendment rights to choose the content of
the publication.39 Since purely commercial advertisements have
been held not to be within this freedom of choice,40 the first
37. Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 234-35, 31 Ohio
Dec. 54, 63-64 (1919), suggested a rough outline of the types of dis-
crimination which might be permitted:
We do not intend to hold that a newspaper company may not
reject some class or classes of advertising entirely, or that it
may not use reasonable discretion in determining whether or
not an advertisement presented is a proper one .... We are
of the opinion, however, that the rules should be reasonable and
applicable to all persons in the same class.
38. Arguably there is legislation presently existing which could be
employed as a remedy by similarly situated plaintiffs. Section 5 (a) (6)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers and directs the Com-
mission "to prevent persons, partnerships or corporations ... from using
unfair methods of competition in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6)
(1964). This provision gives the Comnnission broad power to declare
trade practices unfair, particularly those practices which conflict with
the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, even though these
Acts are not actually violated. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,
320-21 (1966). Thus in LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966),
the court affirmed a finding of unfair practices when a lawful monop-
olist adopted price strategy which resulted in competitive injury to a
class of customers. Though petitioner's motive may have been reason-
able, this was considered irrelevant as long as the practice had an ad-
verse effect on competition. Id. at 120-21. Since it is generally the
monopolistic characteristic of a newspaper which gives rise to the in-justice, perhaps the antitrust laws provide a more appropriate vehicle
for approaching the problem.
39. See cases cited note 25 supra.
40. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The court in that
case never made it clear why the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial advertising should be drawn. For a discussion of this
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amendment perhaps should not bar governmental regulation of
a newspaper's commercial advertising. However, the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech, which was not
recognized in the decisions relied upon in Bloss,4 1 may not be
applicable in this situation. If it were demonstrated that the ad
was rejected because of the publisher's objection to the content
of the movies shown by the theater, this motive would be non-
commercial. Just as "editorial advertisements" published by a
newspaper are within the publisher's freedom of choice, even
though the newspaper is paid for printing the ad,42 so it would
seem that the first amendment should also protect the publisher
refusing to publish an ad for noncommercial reasons, even though
the ad itself might be of a commercial nature.43 Obviously, the
first amendment rights of the newspaper could prevent state
regulation even in the event a public utility is found.
One writer has argued that Government limitations on the
use of private economic power to deny access to the press
issue see Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The
Modern Revised Translation, 49 CouxEL L.Q. 581, 594-95 (1964);
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1005, 1027-38 (1967). Justice Douglas, a member of the unanimous
court that decided Chrestensen, has suggested that the case should be
re-examined. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15
(1959) (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).
41. The following excerpt from Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215
Iowa 1276, 1281, 247 N.W. 813, 815 (1933), which was quoted in Approved
Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704, 706 (Fla. 1965), and by
the Michigan Court of Appeals, 5 Mich. App. 74, 80, 145 N.W.2d 800, 804
(1966), indicates that the courts did not see the distinction:
If a newspaper were required to accept an advertisement, it
could be compelled to publish a news item. If some good
lady gave a tea, and submitted to the newspaper a proper ac-
count of the tea, and the editor of the newspaper, believing
that it had no news value, refused to publish it, she, it seems
to us, would have as much right to compel the newspaper to
publish the account as would a person engaged in business to
compel a newspaper to publish an advertisement of the busi-
ness that that person is conducting.
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. One might even argue on the basis of Sullivan, that movie
advertisements should be considered noncommercial speech since the
movies sought to be advertised might contain some ideas of social
significance. If the reason for the rule in that case was that:
any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carry-
ing "editorial advertisements" of this type, and so might shut
off an important outlet for the promulgation of information
and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to
publishing facilities-who wish to exercise their freedom of
speech even though they are not members of the press,
Id. at 266, it should perhaps make no difference whether the idea is
expressed in the advertisement itself or announces the time and place
where the idea might be heard.
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would promote a wider dissemination of ideas and would thus
be consistent with the central purpose of the first amendment.44
Though much dicta can be found to support this proposition,45
there are no cases which so hold.
While it is generally true that Government controls over the
content of the press are inconsistent with the first amendment, 4
the broadcasting industry has been subjected to a number of
controls imposed by the Federal Communications Commission.
The requirement that a licensee tailor his programming to the
needs of the local community has been held not to constitute
censorship. 47 The FCC's "fairness doctrine" which goes beyond
general programming regulation, imposes a duty on broadcasters
to make a reasonable effort to present opposing viewpoints on
controversial issues. 48 In Red Lion Broadcasing Company v.
FCC49 the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine was upheld
against the claim that that part of the doctrine which requires
broadcasters to provide opportunity for a reply to personal
attacks violated the first amendment. Since Red Lion, the Sev-
enth Circuit has held that the FCC's formalized personal attack
rules5" violate the first amendment.5'1 Though the court did not
rule on the fairness doctrine itself, Red Lion was here criticized.
However, more recently, the most radical extension of the fair-
ness doctrine-an FCC ruling requiring radio and television
44. Barron, supra note 30.
45. E.g., from the opinion of Justice Black in Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), which upheld an antitrust conviction
against Associated Press for attempting to exclude competitors from
membership and access to the AP wire service:
[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagon-
istic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free
press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that
the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas
does not afford nongovernmental combinations a refuge if they
impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed free-
dom. . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the constitu-
tion, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is
not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference
under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests.
Id. at 20.
46. E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
47. Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 846 (1948).
48. Fairness Doctrine, 2 P&F RADIo REG. 2d 1901, 1904 (1964).
49. 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967).
50. See Fairness Doctrine Rules, 10 P&F RADIO REG. 2d 1901 (1967)
for the codification of the personal attack rules.




stations which carry cigarette advertising to make time avail-
able for presentation of anti-smoking information-was upheld
in Banzhof v. FCC.52
The Red Lion and Banzhof rationale, however, does not do
away with the constitutional difficulties posed by the instant
case. First, the degree of previous restraint permitted in these
cases was less than would result from a contrary holding in
Bloss. In Banzhof the court used the technique of measuring
the value of the speech which might be inhibited and the extent
to which the ruling would in fact inhibit such speech, against
the first amendment gain in terms of promoting greater debate
on a public issue.5 3 Since the court viewed cigarette adver-
tising as "marginal speech" which makes little contribution to
public debate and did not think the volume of such advertising
would be significantly affected, the FCC ruling was upheld. In
the instant case, however, the speech which the plaintiff sought
to promote seems equally as marginal as that which might be
inhibited and the question of reaching a result which might
make a positive contribution to public debate was not involved.
Second, the Banzhof court suggested that a greater amount of
governmental control should be permitted in the broadcasting
industry than in the newspaper industry.54
Despite an inadequate analysis of the issues presented, the
result in Bloss is understandable. Though the public does have
a strong interest in newspaper advertising policy, it would be
difficult for a court to recognize precisely what regulations
would satisfy that interest and to develop a consistent set of
standards to define the impermissible forms of publisher dis-
crimination. More important, the imposition of any regulation
on the behavior of newspaper publishers by the courts would
constitute a significant departure from the well-established prin-
ciple that the initiation of economic regulation is more properly
the responsibility of the legislature. Furthermore, even if the
court were prepared to take such a step, the first amendment
seems to bar relief, unless, perhaps, the monopoly power can
cause a shift in emphasis when focusing on potential injustice.
52. 14 P&F RADIO REG. 2d 2061 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
53. Id. at 2087-90.
54. The reasons which the court advances for distinguishing news-
papers from broadcasting are all reasons which explain why there
is a greater need to regulate broadcasting stations. Newspapers are
more likely to incorporate diverse viewpoints in the absence of regu-
lation in order to promote greater access. However, these reasons do
not provide a basis for distinguishing newspapers from broadcasting
stations when a denial of access has occurred.
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Free Speech: Dismissal of Teacher
for Public Statements
Plaintiff was dismissed from his teaching position for writing
and having published in a local newspaper a letter criticizing the
manner in which the Board of Education and the District
Superintendent of Schools had handled past bond issue and tax
increase proposals for public school support. At a hearing
following the dismissal, the school board found the letter "detri-
mental to the efficient operation and administration of the
schools of the district" and concluded that dismissal was in the
"interests of the school." Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court,
which affirmed on a finding that the board's action was supported
by substantial evidence and that the interests of the schools out-
weighed the plaintiff's first amendment rights. The Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the Illinois Supreme Court, holding that public
statements by teachers cannot be cited as grounds for dismissal
unless made with actual malice as shown by knowledge of their
falsity or a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.' Picker-
ing v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
The Supreme Court has said that the importance of free
speech requires close scrutiny of any attempt to restrict its free
exercise.2 Even inaccurate or erroneous statements will be pro-
tected.3 Free speech, however, is not an absolute right,4 and in
1. The Court adopted the standard for defamation of public offi-
cials handed down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964).
2. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Compare
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). It has long been recognized
that the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment protects first
amendment guarantees from adverse state action. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). In Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966), the Court emphasized the importance of
freedom to criticize the Government:
Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitu-
tionally protected area of free discussion. Criticism of those
responsible for government operations must be free, lest criti-
cism of government itself be penalized.
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
The Court specifically noted that the speaker cannot be required to
prove the truth of his statements.
4. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559 (1965); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
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certain instances, as when a "compelling state interest" is in-
volved,5 state limitation has been permitted.6
Conflict between public and private interests frequently
arises when the state seeks to condition the grant of a privilege
or benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right.7 Con-
ditional grants have traditionally been supported by the argu-
ment that the power to withhold the grant of a privilege abso-
lutely implies existence of the power to condition the circum-
stances under which the privilege will be granted.8 With the
development of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the
Court eventually rejected this argument.9 The broadest state-
Compare Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (restrictions struck down
as a prior restraint on speech) with Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957) (restriction on distribution of obscene books upheld).
5. The Court requires that any legislative attempts to limit free
speech be narrowly drawn and capable of precise application. Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The Court will not
countenance a statute capable of selective enforcement against unpopu-
lar causes. NAACP v. Button, supra. See also Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, supra; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). A heavy burden
rests on the state to show that a "compelling state interest" exists
and that no alternative means of regulation with less drastic conse-
quences are available. Shelton v. Tucker, supra; Speiser v. Randall,
supra at 529; accord, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). See also Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242 (1937).
7. There is no limitation on the exercise of state power to induce
the surrender of personal rights not protected by the Constitution.
Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLUM.
L. Rv. 321, 323 (1935).
8. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897):
The right to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily
includes the authority to determine under what circumstances
such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the
lesser.
Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924) (citing Davis).
9. The question whether the state can impose conditions on its
grants of privileges arose when states sought to condition the privilege
of foreign corporations to do business in the state on a waiver of the
right to diversity jurisdiction in federal court. The early decisions up-
held such conditions. E.g., Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202
U.S. 246 (1906); Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1877).
These two cases were overruled by Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257
U.S. 529, 532 (1922) in which the Court said:
[A] State may not, in imposing conditions upon the privi-
lege of a foreign corporation's doing business in the State,
exact from it a waiver of the exercise of its constitutional
right to resort to the federal courts, or thereafter withdraw the
privilege of doing business because its exercise of such right,
whether waived in advance or not.
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 598
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ment of that doctrine was made in Frost & Frost Trucking Com-
pany v. Railroad Commission,'° where the Court held that a
state cannot, as a condition of the receipt of a benefit or privilege,
require the surrender of constitutional rights. Before this doc-
trine was formulated, the Court had allowed such conditions by
distinguishing rights from privileges. It was felt that since a
"privilege" is by definition not required or guaranteed by the
Constitution, its withholding cannot constitute the denial of any
"right."'" The prospective recipient of the benefit need only
reject the privilege to preserve his constitutional rights.12
The right-privilege dichotomy is no longer controlling to-
day, as the Court has come to recognize that in cases of conflict
between conditions sought to be imposed and individual freedoms
there may be a vital state interest which the restriction is de-
signed to protect. In light of this realization, the Court has
adopted the practice of weighing the state interest against the
individual interest. As a result, the fact that a constitutionally
guaranteed right has been surrendered under a condition imposed
by the state is no longer considered as conclusive evidence of
the misuse of state power. Today conditional grants of benefits
are viewed as an alternative means of regulating conduct which
threatens a vital state interest. 3 Thus, the modern doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions represen;s a narrowing of the Court's
(1926), opened the way for application of this doctrine to other grants
of privilege by the states.
10. 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926):
[A]s a general rule, the state, having power to deny a
privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it
sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect
is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not
impose conditions which require the relinquishment of consti-
tutional rights. If the state may ccmpel the surrender of one
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like
manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guaranties embedded in the Constitution of United States may
thus be manipulated out of existence.
The best discussion of the cases developing this doctrine is found in
Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLu .
L. REV. 321 (1935). See also Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77
U. PA. L. REV. 879 (1929). For a good, recent summary of the modern
doctrine see Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1595
(1960), and Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
11. The Court made reference to this dichotomy in upholding the
condition on the basis of the traditional argument in Packard v. Ban-
ton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924).
12. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923); Pullman Co.
v. Adams, 189 U.S. 420, 422 (1903). See also note 15 infra.




broad holding in Frost. It states that the enjoyment of a govern-
mental benefit or privilege may not be conditioned upon the
waiver of a constitutional right where there is no overriding
state interest requiring such relinquishment. The Court further
requires that the condition be reasonably and substantially re-
lated to the state interest, and that the state show there is no
alternative means of regulation available which would avoid the
restriction of constitutional guarantees.14
In the past, the Court viewed public employment as a priv-
ilege and consequently held that no one had a right to be free
from conditions on such employment.15 The doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions, however, placed the right-privilege dichot-
omy in doubt and brought with it the recognition that in many
instances the grant of a privilege may involve an individual in-
terest substantial enough to merit protection. 6 The validity of
this realization is supported by the dilemma which faces the
prospective public employee whose employment is conditioned
on the waiver of first amendment rights. He is forced to choose
between the free exercise of these rights and the achievement of
personal economic well-being.' 7 In this context the exercise of
14. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967) (quoting
Shelton); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.,
350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956). The idea that relatedness alone may not suf-
fice, absent a showing that substantial harm is threatened, is suggested
by Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned
Public Spending, 41 CoRNELL L.Q. 12 (1955).
15. Justice Holmes' statement in McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), is generally thought to be the first refer-
ence to this idea: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
Since McAuliffe, courts have frequently made reference to this notion.
See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Swaaley v. United States, 376
F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965);
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
16. See generally Note, Judicial Acquiescence in the Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights Through Expansion of the Conditioned Privilege
Doctrine, 28 IND. L.J. 520, 537-38 (1952), for a discussion of this idea
within the context of government employment. See also Willcox, supra
note 14, at 30-56. Professor K. C. Davis attacked the privilege ar-
gument in Davis, The Requirement of an Opportunity to be Heard in
the Administrative Process, 51 YALE L.J. 1093 (1942), and later noted that
the decisions in Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956), and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) indicate that the
privilege argument no longer has much force. Davis, The Require-
ment of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. Ruv. 193, 227-34 (1957).
17. Note, Judicial Acquiescence, supra note 16, at 538. The Court
criticized such a choice in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 374 (1964).
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state power is more accurately viewed as a coercive force to in-
duce surrender of these rights than as an offer of voluntary
choice.'
The Court has stated that surrender of constitutional rights
as a precondition to public employment may not be achieved
by a vaguely drawn statute.19 The statute must be clear and
specific in its provisions and must bear a direct relation to a vital
state interest which has been shown to exist. The Court has
recognized the fitness of public school teachers as such an in-
terest.20 Thus, it is the duty of the teacher to conduct himself,
both in and out of the classroom, in a manner that maintains the
integrity of the schools. 2' Accordingly, inquiries into the fitness
of a teacher may be extended beyond his classroom activities to
those not directly related to his teaching.22  In these circum-
stances the Court also demands specificity in the statutory regu-
lation of teachers to guard against the case of the conscientious
teacher foregoing the exercise of rights not actually subject to
regulation under the statute in aa effort to stay within the
bounds of vaguely drawn statutory requirements. 23
Apparently in an effort to insure that teachers meet their
responsibilities, many state statutes grant broad discretionary
power to local school boards to discipline or dismiss teachers.24
The courts have shown a marked reluctance to interfere with ex-
18. Note, Judicial Acquiescence, supra note 16, at 538.
19. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
20. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952); accord, Beilan
v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (2958). See also Walsh v. Hine,
59 Conn. 50, 21 A. 1024 (1890); Associated Schools v. School Dist., 122
Minn. 254, 142 N.W. 325 (1913).
21. See Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 405-07 (1957).
22. Id. at 406; accord, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). For a
treatment of the kind of conduct that has been used as the basis for dis-
missal of teachers, see Behling, The Legal Gravity of Specific Acts in Cases
of Teacher Dismissal, 43 N.D.L. REV. 753 (1967); Punke, Insubordination
in Teacher Dismissal, 45 MxcH. S.B.J. 51 (Aug. 1966).
23. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555
(1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Bagley v. Washington
Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1966).
24. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13403 (West 1968); ILL. Rav. STAT. ch.
122, § 10-22.4 (1965); IND. Anx. STAT. § 28-4308 (1968); MAss. GmN. AwN.
LAWS ch. 71, § 42 (Supp. 1968); M1m. STAT. § 125.17 (1967). Where the
statutory language with respect to a board's discretionary power is not all-
inclusive, the courts will often construe it so as to achieve the same effect
as a broadly drawn statute. E.g., Horoskc v. Mount Pleasant School Dist.,
335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 866 (1939), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
interpreted "incompetency" to include conduct beyond that bearing on
the teacher's specific ability as a teacher.
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ercises of discretion by local boards, provided that actions do not
appear to be "arbitrary. 25
There is little case law dealing with disciplinary actions
against teachers for statements criticizing educational adminis-
trations. One notable attempt to define the limits of critical
speech outside the classroom was undertaken by the California
District Court of Appeal.26  The California statute provides for
dismissal when the teacher engages in "unprofessional con-
duct."27 The California court held that this includes statements
made in letters that are critical of the school board when they
are found to be either disruptive to the discipline or harmful to
the teaching process of the school. While other courts have de-
veloped similar tests for reviewing board action resulting in
teacher dismissal,28 California is the only state to apply this kind
of test to critical speech outside the classroom.
The Pickering Court held that absent a showing that the
statement was made with actual malice, as evidenced by knowl-
edge of its falsity or reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, the
best interests of the school cannot be the sole determinant in
teacher dismissal proceedings. Instead, the court saw the prob-
lem as requiring a balancing of the teacher's right as a private
citizen to speak freely on public issues against the state's interest
in promoting the efficiency of the public school system by con-
trolling the conduct of its employees.2 9 The Pickering Court
struck the balance in favor of the teacher's first amendment
rights.8 0
25. Rinaldo v. School Comm., 294 Mass. 167, 169, 1 N.E.2d 37, 38
(1936); Finch v. Fractional School Dist., 225 Mich. 674, 196 N.W. 532
(1924); Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 88 Wisc. 7, 58
N.W. 1042 (1894). One court, in construing a broadly drawn statute,
went so far as to declare that it is for the board, and not the court, to
determine what constitutes grounds for dismissal. Faxon v. School
Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954). However, the Supreme
Court has held that while the responsibility for supervision of the public
school systems rests with the states, it will not permit interference with
federal constitutional provisions protected from state action. Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
26. Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal. Rptr.
710 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
27. CAL. EDUC. CODE, § 13403 (a) (West 1968).
28. E.g., Watts v. Seward School Bd., 421 P.2d 586 (Alas. 1966);
Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist., 41 Ohio Op. 2d 423,
12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233 N.E.2d 143 (C.P. 1967). Similar tests have been
developed in government employee dismissal cases not involving teach-
ers. Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965); Belshaw v. City of
Berkeley, 246 Cal. App. 2d 493, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1st Dist. 3rd Div. 1966).
29. 391 U.S. at 568.
30. In so holding, the Court did not reach the plaintiffs challenge
to the statute's validity on vagueness grounds. 391 U.S. at 565 n.l.
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The Court found that Pickering's letter regarding the pro-
posed tax increase, and the administration's conduct with refer-
ence to it, involved public issues on which wide discussion should
be encouraged.3' On such issues the teacher could be expected
to have an informed opinion which should be made available to
the general public.3 2 The Court also found that neither plain-
tiff's speech nor his conduct had been shown to have interfered
with his classroom duties or the routine operation of the school. 3
Reasoning that the letter was addressed to a matter of public
concern-money spent on athletics by the school administration
-and that no evidence had been introduced to support the board
members' charge that it damaged their professional reputations,
the Court concluded that the statements were not "per se detri-
mental to the district's schools. '3 4 The Court equated the
teacher's conduct with that of other members of the general
public who might have criticized the board's action, and whom
the state could not regulate, and concluded that such public
statements could not serve as grounds for dismissal.35 In so
holding, the Court reaffirmed its prior decision that teachers
may not be compelled, as a condition of their employment, to
waive their rights as citizens to comment on matters of public
31. 391 U.S. at 571-72.
32. It has been noted that a government employee, by virtue of his
position as a servant of the people, may be under a "moral duty" to
make recommendations to improve the public service. Brickman v.
New Orleans Aviation Bd., 236 La. 143, 107 So. 2d 422 (1958). The
Supreme Court has placed particular emphasis on this with regard to
elected officials. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); cf. United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
33. 391 U.S. at 572-73.
34. Id. at 571. The Court noted that the board could only have
reached its decision that the letter was detrimental by equating its
members' interests with those of the school system as a whole. It rea-
soned that the statement regarding what Pickering thought to be a dis-
proportionate expenditure for athletics should be viewed as a mere dif-
ference of opinion between Pickering and the administration on a
matter of public interest. While the Court felt that such a statement
could not of itself harm the school, that is not necessarily true. Nor is
it true that equating the board members' interests with those of the
school does not serve the educational function. While it may be argued
that the board's interest in its policies to implement the educational
function of the schools is different from the state's interest in that func-
tion, it is also true that the board's interest may be in service to the
school. For example, the case where the high school achieves a greater
part of its public support, including a public willingness to follow board
bond issue proposals because of the athletic success of the school, which
is attributable to the board's generous policy with regard to expendi-
tures for athletic purposes.
35. 391 U.S. at 574.
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concern relating to the schools.3 6
While protecting the teachers' right to comment on public
issues, the Court clearly denies any intent to establish a broad
immunity applicable to all critical utterances by teachers.3 7 In-
deed, the opinion contains several references to special circum-
stances which might tip the balance in favor of the state in-
terest. The Court indicates that its standard might not be
appropriate in cases involving a need for confidentiality in con-
nection with public employment; 38 when a close occupational
relationship exists between the teacher and the person criti-
cized; 39 when established procedures for raising grievances are
available which have not been employed by the teacher;40 or
when the statements are so false that they place in doubt the
teacher's fitness for his position.41 In addition, it may be in-
ferred that the Court might withhold the immunity if the state-
ment were particularly difficult to rebut,4 or if it resulted in a
direct interference with classroom duties or the day-to-day oper-
ation of the school system.43
The Pickering Court demonstrated a willingness to go beyond
considerations of procedural due process and engage in an exam-
ination of the substantive grounds for dismissal used in specific
cases by local school boards.44 Compared with the courts' prior
reluctance to interfere with exercises of school board discretion,45
this represents a significant development in the protection of
teachers' freedom of speech.46  However, the decision does not
36. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). This
standard represents the culmination of a series of cases which date back
to Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), where a restrictive
statutory scheme was upheld but the Court indicated that unreasonable
conditions might not be permitted. See also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952).
37. 391 U.S. at 569.
38. Id. at 570 n.3.
39. Id. at 569, 570 n.3.
40. Id. at 572 n.4.
41. Id. at 573 n.5.
42. Id. at 572.
43. Id. at 572-73. For a discussion of the inappropriateness of al-
lowing any of these special circumstances, standing alone, to provide the
basis for an exception to the Pickering standard, see Note, The First
Amendment and Public Employees: Times Marches On, 57 GEo. L.J.
134, 150-56 (1968).
44. The Court has previously shown a willingness to extend the
New York Times standard where free speech is threatened but where
there is no charge of civil libel as in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964) (criminal libel).
45. See note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
46. Accord, Note, supra note 43, at 149.
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lend itself to the broad application that is suggested at first blush.
The Court does not establish clear substantive guidelines for
judging school board action in future dismissal cases. 47 The
decision may, in fact, be limited to what appeared to the Court
to be an obvious abuse of the discretionary power of the school
board.
The Court made no reference to the "disruptive harm" test
as applied by the California court.48 Instead, the Court chose to
emphasize the public nature of the controversy dealt with in the
letter. Thus, although statements by teachers on matters of
public concern appear to be protected in certain circumstances,
it is not clear what effect harm or disruption to the school sys-
tem would have on the outcome of future cases.49 The special
circumstances which the Court mentioned or alluded to involve
situations in which harm to the school system could result. In
addition, the Court holds open the possibility that true state-
ments as well as negligently false ones might be subject to limi-
tation if special circumstances involving harmful consequences
were presented. 50
The Pickering Court noted that since the letter was pub-
lished after both school bond issues and the subsequent tax in-
crease proposals had been rejected by the voters, it could not
have had any effect on the outcome of the referendum. This fact,
coupled with the Court's observation that most of the statements
in the letter were substantially correct,5 ' and in any event could
easily have been rebutted by the board, suggests that the appar-
ent lack of harm to the functioning of the school may have had
more impact on the Court's decision than appears on the face of
the opinion. At the very least, the Court left room for limitation
of a teacher's speech when, in special circumstances, it could
harm the school system.
In Pickering, the Court struck a delicate balance between
47. Id. at 150.
48. Board of Trustees v. Owens, 206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal. Rptr.
710 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
49. The Court's emphasis on the fact that Pickering's statement did
not have any harmful impact has been severely criticized. Note, supra
note 43, at 155.
50. 391 U.S. at 570 n.3.
51. The letters to the editor and the Court's analysis of them are
set out in the appendix to the opinion. The Court found that many
of the statements were substantially true and condemned any notion
that these could be cited as grounds for dismissal solely because the
school board disapproved of them. Where the statements were found
to be false the Court applied the New York Times standard to deter-
mine whether they could properly be used as grounds for dismissal.
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public and private interests which have been vigilantly protected
when standing alone.52 Certainly, this contributed to the Court's
cautious opinion on the facts presented. While understandable,
this caution leaves a major problem unresolved. The Court
seems to hold that a teacher acting as a citizen must be pro-
tected in the exercise of constitutional rights guaranteed to all
citizens. Unfortunately, the opinion offers few guidelines for
determining when a teacher speaks as teacher rather than citi-
zen. The Court does not make clear whether the bare fact that a
statement concerns a public issue classifies the teacher as a pri-
vate citizen or as a teacher. Moreover, the Court fails to con-
sider whether a teacher, speaking as a teacher, can be limited
in his exercise of first amendment rights even in the absence of
special circumstances.5 3  Such uncertainty leaves undiminished
in these situations the "chilling effect" which the Court has
condemned."4
The Court should make clear at its first opportunity that
harm resulting from statements of teachers on public issues can
not be determinative in teacher dismissal proceedings. Rather,
the Court should adopt the standard that any negligently false
statement made with reference to such issues by a teacher is
made by him as a private citizen and in the absence of a showing
of "compelling state interest" is to be afforded equivalent first
amendment protection.
Free Speech: Peaceful Picketing
on Quasi-Public Property
A food employees union peacefully picketed a nonunion
supermarket situated in a large shopping center. Confining their
patrolling to the porch and parcel pickup zone of the supermarket
52. See notes 5 & 20 supra.
53. A separate problem raised by this decision is referred to by
Justice White in his opinion. This is the question of whether the Court
is now ready to withdraw from its position in Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964), and reconsider the question of whether a statement
that was knowingly or recklessly false but without harmful effect
should be afforded first amendment protection. Justice White argues
that the harmful impact or lack thereof in critical statements which are
recklessly made would have no effect on the Court's deliberation in
such cases.
54. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); Bag-
gett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 368 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Speiser v. Ran-
dall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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and the shopping center's adjacent parking lot, the pickets car-
ried placards publicizing the nonunion wages and benefits re-
ceived by the supermarket employees. None of the supermar-
ket's employees took part in the picketing. The owners of the
supermarket and shopping center obtained an injunction against
the union activity from a Pennsylvania trial court on the grounds
that it constituted a trespass on private property and was con-
ducted for an unlawful purpose. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed on the sole ground of trespass.' Reversing, the
United States Supreme Court held that the first and fourteenth
amendments forbid the prohibition of peaceful picketing solely
because it occurred on privately owned property if the property
served the community as a business block which was open and
accessible to the public. Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Incorporated, 391 U.S. 308
(1968) .2
Picketing has not always enjoyed judicial approval as legiti-
mate labor activity.3 Well into the twentieth century it con-
tinued to be regarded by some courts as inherently coercive and,
therefore, unlawful regardless of the manner in which it was
actually conducted.4 This view was not unanimous,5 however,
and following the Clayton Act of 1914,6 which proscribed the use
of restraining orders to prohibit any person from "peacefully
persuading" others to "abstain from working," the prevailing
1. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. v. Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590, 425 Pa. 382, 227 A.2d 874 (1967). (In the unofficial
reporter just cited, the union is mistakenly referred to as "Local 509"
in the Table of Cases, at xi, and in the title of the case, at 874.)
2. Hereinafter cited as Amalgamated.
3. 1 L. TELLER, LABOR DISPUTE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 112
(1940); Samoff, Picketing and the First Amendment: "Full Circle" and
"Formal Surrender," 9 LAB. L.J. 889, 890 (1958).
4. The following oft-quoted statement sums up the view of such
courts: "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any
more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful
lynching." Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa
1905). Similarly, in overturning 42 years of precedent holding picketing
to be illegal per se the Michigan Supreme Court said, "Any form of
picketing was abhorrent to the common law." Book Tower Garage, Inc.
v. Local 415, 295 Mich. 580, 583; 295 N.W. 320, 321 (1940).
For early federal court holdings questioning the legality of pick-
eting per se, see Sona v. Aluminum Castings Co., 214 F. 936 (6th Cir.
1914); Kolley v. Robinson, 187 F. 415 (8th Cir. 1911); Southern Ry.
v. Machinists Local Union, 111 F. 49 (W.D. Tenn. 1901); Otis Steel Co.
v. Local Union, 110 F. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1901). See also note 3 supra.
5. For a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction listing of early twentieth cen-
tury court holdings which permitted peaceful picketing in conjunc-
tion with a lawful strike, see L. TELLER, supra note 3, at § 111, n.43.
6. Clayton Act of 1914 § 20, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1964).
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judicial attitude was significantly altered.7 Nevertheless, picket-
ing did not receive broad constitutional protection until 1940
when declared, in Thornhill v. Alabama,8 to be a form of free
speech shielded by the first and fourteenth amendments.
But such protection was never intended to be unlimited or
absolute. The Thornhill Court indicated that picketing could
be restricted to at least the same extent as free speech,9 while
later decisions have allowed even greater restrictions under some
circumstances. 10 This was because picketing was recognized to
involve elements of conduct, such as patrolling, as well as ele-
ments of speech. The Supreme Court has, for example, upheld
the restriction of picketing when conducted in an obstructing
manner." Similarly, picketing which has the effect of coercing
persons not to deal with another, in violation of a valid state
restraint of trade statute, may be enjoined. 2  The Court, how-
ever, has never accepted the proposition that the nonspeech as-
pect of peaceful picketing is so great as to deny it constitutional
protection altogether. 13
One of the factors weighed in determining the extent to
which the right of peaceful picketing ought be protected has
been the ownership of the property involved.' 4  In Thornhill
7. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) (held
a state statute permitting peaceful picketing constitutional); American
Steel Found. Co. v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921)
(listed conditions under which peaceful picketing would be held legal).
8. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
9. The Thornhill Court said it would allow restriction of the right
to picket "where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by
competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion." Id. at
104-05.
10. As stated by Justice Frankfurter: "It has been amply recog-
nized that picketing, not being the equivalent of speech as a matter of
fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent." Hughes v. Superior Court,
339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950). See also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611
(1968); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
11. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
12. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
13. Amalgamated at 313.
14. The Court has also taken into account: (1) the manner in
which the picketing was conducted, Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941); Traux v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921); (2) the purpose for which the picketing was conducted,
Local 10, United Ass'n of Jimn. Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953)
(cannot conflict with valid state right-to-work legislation); Building
Serv. Employees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (cannot
conflict with valid state antitrust legislation); Teamsters Local 309
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (cannot conflict with valid state pro-
tection of small business legislation).
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the picketing was conducted on public streets which the Court
approved as "natural and proper places for the dissemination of
information and opinion .... -15 Similarly, peaceful picketing
on highways, 6 avenues,17 sidewalks, 8 and city park board-
walks 9 has been permitted. This is due to the traditional asso-
ciation which has come to exist between public property and the
exercise of first amendment freedoms.20 So strong is this asso-
ciation that municipal licensing ordinances have been struck
down2 1 which placed an inconvenience in the path of free speech
related activities such as handbilling22 and religious speeches.
23
Picketing on private property, on the other hand, has proved
to be much less sanctified. The consistency with which state
courts have given unqualified support to private property in-
terests24 has driven one commentator to declare that, "[t]he tra-
ditional notion would seem to be that the concept [of private
ownership] suffices as an absolute defense against those who
would engage in union activity."25
Placed into this setting Marsh v. Alabama,26 which involved
a Jehovah's Witness desiring to distribute religious literature on
the business district sidewalks of a company-owned town, re-
As to the person doing the picketing, the Court has held that there
is no distinction between employees and non-employees. AFL v. Swing,
312 U.S. 321 (1941).
15. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 106 (1940), quoting Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
16. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. :06 (1940).
17. NLRB v. Local 50, Bakery 'Workers, 245 F.2d 542, 544 (2d
Cir. 1957).
18. NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 75 (1964).
19. People v. Ribinovich, 171 Misc. 569, 13 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Magis. Ct.
1939).
20. Amalgamated at 315.
21. But see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parading
could be regulated because it was not considered informative in na-
ture).
22. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). But see Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
23. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
24. See People ex rel. Koester v. Rozensweig, 171 Misc. 702, 13
N.Y.S.2d 795 (Magis. Ct. 1939); Fairlawn Meats, Inc. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters Local 427, 99 Ohio App. 517, 136 N.E.2d 689 (1955), rev'd
on procedural grounds, 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Stafford v. Hood, 213 Tenn.
684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964). But see Mazo, 38 CCH Lab. Cas. 65835
(Il. 1959); People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Magis. Ct.
1948).
25. Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of "Quasi-
Public" Property, 49 MINN. L. REv. 505, 509 (1965).
26. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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sulted in the first real instance of private property rights giving
way to those of free speech. Reasoning that handbilling was
constitutionally protected in a regular municipality,27 the Marsh
Court saw no reason for not protecting it in a company-owned
town which had all the characteristics of a regular munici-
pality.28 In response to the contention that private ownership
demanded a different result, the Court declared:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his own advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the . . . constitutional rights of those who use it.29
Thus, the Court broadened its focus to consider not only the
ownership of the property, but also its use and characteristics.
When the locus of the conflict turned to shopping centers,
however, courts applied the Marsh doctrine inconsistently, de-
pending on which aspect they deemed important. In Moreland
Corporation v. Retail Store Employees Local 444,30 for example,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied only on the "open-for
public-use" aspect of Marsh to label shopping center property as
quasi-public, thus protecting the picketing. Similarly, a Mary-
land court sustained the picketing of a shopping center drug-
store,3 1 declaring irrelevant the fact that the shopping center
was distinguishable from the property in Marsh because it lacked
the characteristics of an inhabited town.32 An Ohio court 3s re-
jected both the use aspect of the doctrine-stating that store
owners only open up their property for use by "potential custom-
ers" rather than the general public 4 --and the characteristics
aspect-noting that "[t]he resemblance of private property to
public property, however great, does not ipso facto convert it to
the public use.' 3 53 Still other decisions have ignored Marsh en-
tirely.36 While the lower courts groped for a discernable con-
27. Id. at 504-05.
28. Id. at 502-03.
29. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
30. 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962).
31. State v. Williams, 44 LRRM 2357 (Baltimore, Md. Cr. Ct. 1959).
32. Id. at 2362.
33. South Discount Foods, Inc. v. Local 1552, 14 Ohio Misc. 188,
235 N.E.2d 143 (1968).
34. Id. at 194, 235 N.E.2d at 147.
35. Id. at 198, 235 N.E.2d at 149. See also Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122
N.W.2d 785 (1963) (dissenting opinion) (declaring that a shopping cen-
ter was "not a town in any sense of the word").
36. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. v. Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590, 425 Pa. 382, 227 A.2d 874 (1967) (the dissent, however,
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stitutional standard, 7 the Supreme Court, prior to Amalgamated,
postponed settling the issue through denials of certiorari38 and
narrow holdings.39
The majority opinion in Amalgamated" begins from the
premise that peaceful picketing on public property is protected
by the first amendment. 41 It then narrows the issue to whether
this otherwise constitutionally protected right could be denied
simply because the property involved was privately rather than
publicly owned.42 In this context, the majority is unwilling
to consider only ownership as the relevant factor. Therefore,
the physical characteristics of the shopping center are scruti-
nized and compared to those of the company town in Marsh,
revealing striking similarities between the Marsh "business
block" and the Logan Valley shopping center.43 The center's
roadways, parking areas, and sidewalks are reasoned to be the
functional equivalents of those found in Marsh or any other
did refer to Marsh); Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766
(1964).
37. "MWhen the colors do not match, when the references in the
index fail, when there is no decisive precedent the judge has no clear
mandate. . . ." South Discount Foods, Inc. v. Local 1552, 14 Ohio Misc.
188, 192, 235 N.E.2d 143, 146 (1968).
38. Schwartz-Torrnace Invest. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31,
61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965);
People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 305, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927
(1961).
39. "Whether a State may frame and enforce an injunction aimed
narrowly at a trespass of this sort [on quasi-public property] is a ques-
tion that is not here." Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fair-
lawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 24 (1957).
Several labor law decisions have, however, attempted to settle the
conflict between property rights of employers and the statutory rights
of employees to organize. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilson Co., 351
U.S. 105 (1956) (nonemployees desiring to distribute union literature could
be excluded from a company parking lot if where no discrimination was
involved and where other reasonable means of communication were avail-
able); NLRB v. Le Tourneau Co., 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (employees could
not be denied the right to distribute union literature on a company park-
ing lot during nonworking hours).
But since the emphasis in these cases is upon labor-management
relations with respect to property rights, rather than free speech and
quasi-public property, it would be dangerous to apply inferences drawn
from these cases unequivocally to the quasi-public property problem.
25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 53, 54 n.9.
40. The majority opinion, written by Justice Marshal, attracted
four other votes; Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion, while
Justices White, Harlan, and Black dissented.
41. Amalgamated at 313. This is true even if the picketing is
being conducted by nonemployees. AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
42. Amalgamated at 315.
43. Id. at 317-18.
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municipality.4 4  Since handbilling is protected in these loca-
tions, 45 the majority finds it inconsistent to disallow picketing
in a shopping center.46
But the majority does not rely solely on the shopping cen-
ter's physical similarity to a municipality; it considers the com-
mercial nature of the property as well. They agree with Marsh
that when a businessman voluntarily opens his property for pub-
lic use to his commercial benefit, he can not claim the same pro-
tection of his privacy as he could have when using the property
as a domicile.47 The majority also cites statistical studies show-
ing the change in commercial orientation from municipal busi-
ness districts to suburban shopping centers. 4  Therefore, pro-
tection of the modern-day shoppers' and workers' right to pub-
licize their ideas concerning various commercial enterprises
necessitates a change in the traditional categorization of property
for first amendment purposes.
In separate dissenting opinions Justices Black and White
strongly criticised the majority for extending Marsh beyond its
actual holding.49 They argued that in Marsh first amendment
rights are protected not because the property is a business dis-
trict, but because it is a town. Therefore, Marsh is only rele-
vant when all the characteristics of a town are present. They
would not characterize as a town the Logan Valley shopping cen-
ter because it lacked such essentials as residential buildings, a
sewage disposal plant, and a post office. While both dissenters
indicate they think it appropriate to require the private owners
of a town to guarantee the exercise of first amendment freedoms
in traditional locations, neither gives countenance to forcing this
responsibility on a businessman operating a store within the con-
text of a shopping center. But what they seem to fear most is
the inability to draw a line, after Amalgamated, limiting the
44. Id.
45. The Court indicated that for the purposes of discussing the re-
lationship between free speech and private property, there is little
relevant distinction between handbilling and picketing, since they both
involve communication plus conduct. Id. at 315-16.
46. Id. at 319.
47. Id. at 325.
48. Id. at 324-25.
49. Id. at 327, 337. Also dissenting was Justice Harlan who felt
that the state court had no jurisdiction over this case in the first place
because of the "pre-emption doctrine." Id. at 333. For discussions of
the pre-emption doctrine as related to these types of problems, see
Gould, supra note 24, at 533; Note, Shopping Centers and Labor Rela-




free speech activity exercised in shopping centers or individual
stores.5"
Such criticism is overly technical, however, for it fails to
consider the policy aspects of the Marsh doctrine. That a shop-
ping center does not contain all the physical characteristics of a
company town is obvious, but this alone does not vitiate the de-
cision in Amalgamated. The policy behind Marsh is based on a
desire for continued protection of individual free speech rights
despite a structural change in municipal ownership.51 Similarly,
Amalgamated reflects the desire to preserve such rights in a
society experiencing extensive change in its commercial setting.5 2
To have ignored these changes would, perhaps, have been the
easier alternative. Then the law would remain simply that pro-
tection of first amendment rights would be dependent upon the
ownership of the locus. But old classifications often fail in solv-
ing new problems. To disallow patrons or workers the right to
protest against the policies of a particular enterprise situated in
a shopping center, while allowing it in any other municipal busi-
ness district, is absurd so long as congestion can, in both circum-
stances, be kept to a minimum by other reasonable restrictions.
In light of such a sound basis in public policy, the criticism that
Amalgamated is factually distinguishable from Marsh is negli-
gible at most.
The dissenters were accurate, however, in stating that the
majority fails to clarify the extent to which its rationale can
be used to justify opening up shopping center property generally
to other free speech activities such as parades, political rallies or
religious speeches. Although the majority specifically refuses to
answer this question,53 they do provide some guidelines by say-
ing that they would only permit activities conducted "in a man-
50. Justice White went so far as to set out a parade of absurdities
which he claimed were the logical result of the majority's reasoning.
These included: compelling shopping centers "to permit picketing on its
property for other communicative purposes" and allowing pickets to
quietly enter the store and march around with messages on front and
back. Id. at 339. But the majority gave more of an answer to this
than Justice White seems willing to admit. See notes 54-58 infra, and ac-
companying text.
51. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 n.8 (1946), Justice
Black pointed out:
In the bituminous coal industry alone, approximately one-half
of the miners in the United States lived in company-owned
houses in the period from 1922-23. .he percentage varied from
9 per cent in Illinois and Indiana and 64 per cent in Kentucky,
to almost 80 per cent in West Virginia.
52. Amalgamated at 324-25.
53 Id. at 319-20. (emphasis added).
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ner and for a purpose generally consonant" with the actual use
of the property.54 This language, however, could arguably be
interpreted in opposing ways. It could mean, for example, that
only those activities will be permissible which attempt to pre-
sent information and opinion concerning a particular store.
Such an interpretation is supported somewhat by the listing of
several types of activity which the majority was interested in
protecting-workers seeking to challenge substandard working
conditions, consumers protesting shoddy or over priced merchan-
dise, and minority groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring pol-
icies.5  This limiting language could easily be ignored, however,
by courts deciding future cases. They could look solely to the
"generally consonant with use" language, taking it to mean that
when property is used as a "business district," free speech activ-
ities could not be restricted any more than in a regular municipal
business district. Thus, religious handbilling and general speech
making"6 would have to be allowed even though the opinions
expressed were unrelated to the policies and practices of the
shopping center stores. This broader interpretation would be
unfortunate for while it seems reasonable to encumber the busi-
nessman with the responsibilities commensurate with the priv-
ileges and advantages of conducting a shopping center business,
it does not follow that he should provide a general public forum.
In this context the distinctions drawn by Justices Black and
White 7 between the company town of Marsh and the shopping
center property, have considerable merit. In the company town
all of the traditional locations for free speech activity are on
privately owned property. But in Amalgamated, nearby schools,
parks and other traditional sites for speech making probably
existed. Therefore, the necessity for protecting free speech of
all types is not present in the shopping center situation. In light
of this distinction the narrower application of Amalgamated to
quasi-public property cases seems preferable in that it would
allow the relative importance of the free speech and property
right interests to be properly balanced in each situation.
The decision also fails to give an adequate definition of
"shopping center." At the time the injunction was issued the
Logan Valley Plaza consisted of only two enterprises, although
fifteen more were to follow.58 True, some large shopping centers
54. Id. at 320 n.9.
55. Id. at 324.
56. See cases cited note 21 supra.
57. Amalgamated at 327, 337.
58. Id. at 317-18.
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are so omnipresent in a community as effectively to replace a
town center. But smaller neighborhood clusters of stores do
not. Since, in the latter situation, the public streets and side-
walks are usually near enough to a target store so as not to
diminish the effect of the communication,5 9 picketing could, con-
sistent with Amalgamated, be prohibited from the owner's prop-
erty.
60
Claiming that the issue was not before them,61 the Court set
no specific geographical or physical "imitations on picketing other
than that it can not be totally proscribed. This should not be
viewed as an unqualified granting of a picketing privilege, how-
ever, since the Court indicated that reasonable regulation might
yet be permissible, at least to the same extent as it would be in a
regular municipality. Thus, the state is not without the power
to restrict the picketing reasonably as to time, place, manner, or
number.62 Since it is the desire of the pickets to focus patron
attention on a particular enterprise, there seems to be no reason
to extend their protection beyond -the area immediately to the
front of the store, beyond the hours that the store is open, or
beyond the number necessary to convey the message with mini-
mal obstruction or congestion.
Amalgamated is indeed a timely decision in that it provides
an equitable solution to a new type of free speech problem created
by a recognizable change in the commercial structure of society.
But its value as such will be greatly diminished if its rationale
is used to open shopping centers and other quasi-public property
to free speech activities of every type and purpose. It must be
remembered that quasi-public property is also quasi-private and
that the Constitution protects property rights as well as those of
free speech. Anything other than a test which requires a re-
lationship between the purpose of the speech and the actual use
of the property ignores this distinction.
59. In Amalgamated the property owners argued that forcing the
pickets to move their activity beyond the parking lot to the "grassy
berms" separating the shopping center and the public highways was
not a prohibition but rather a reasonable regulation. The Court re-
jected this argument because the size of the parking lot would have
diminished the effect of the picketing. Id. at 321-23.
60. See People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (1961).
61. Amalgamated at 321.
62. Id. at 319-20.
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Juvenile Procedure: "Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt" Standard of Proof
Extended to Juveniles
Robert Urbasek, a juvenile, was held delinquent' by the
Juvenile division of the Cook County Circuit Court on the basis
of a finding that a preponderance 2 of the evidence supported
the conclusion that Robert had murdered an eleven-year-old
playmate. An appeal was taken to the First Division of the Illi-
nois Appellate Court, where the Juvenile Court's findings were
affirmed. 3 The court found that the adjudicatory hearing had
measured up "to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment," and held that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
of proof did not apply.4 The juvenile appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court, where he contended that continued use of the
preponderance of the evidence rule violated the United States
Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the standard
of proof which is used in criminal cases is constitutionally re-
quired at the adjudicatory stage of juvenile delinquency hearings
whenever the child is charged with misconduct which would be
criminal if an adult were involved. In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535,
232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
Prior to 1899, children over seven years of age5 and adults
were similarly treated by the criminal law of the several states.
Juveniles were given long prison sentences, were incarcerated
with adult criminals, and were encumbered for life with the
social and economic stigma of a criminal record. Moreover, they
1. Juvenile Court Act of 1965, ILL. ST. ANN. § 701-1 (Smith-Hurd
1967). The Act defines "Delinquent Minors" as follows:
(a) any boy who prior to his 17th birthday or girl who prior to
her 18th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regard-
less of where the act occurred, any federal or state law or
municipal ordinance; and (b) any minor who has violated a
lawful court order made under this Act.
Id. at § 702-2.
2. Juvenile Court Act of 1965, 37 ILL. ST. ANN. §§ 701-4, 704-6
(Smith-Hurd 1967). Section 701-4 is a definition of an adjudicatory
hearing; § 704-6 provides that "no finding of delinquency may be made
unless supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and that such a
finding may not be based solely upon extra-judicial admissions or con-
fessions."
3. In re Urbasek, 76 Ill. App. 2d 375 (1966).
4. Id. at 383.
5. At common law, children under seven were conclusively pre-
sumed incapable of entertaining criminal intent. People v. Fields, 174
Misc. 309, 20 N.Y.S.2d 702 (King's Cty. Ct. 1940). See also In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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were afforded no more opportunity than adult convicts for so-
cial or moral reform and re-education. 6
At the end of the nineteenth century, legal reformers began
to recognize that the criminal law as applied to juveniles was
both harsh and ineffective; it had failed either to deter miscon-
duct or to reform juvenile lawbreakers.7 In an attempt to pro-
vide solutions to these problems, states enacted statutes creating
special juvenile court systems. Under these statutes, juvenile
courts, as surrogates for the states, were to assume the role of
parens patriae-state guardians of those citizens unable to fend
for themselves.8 Their function was to identify and analyze the
juvenile wrongdoer's problems and needs, and to prescribe treat-
ment for him in a special, non-criminal procedure. 9 Their pur-
pose was not to determine guilt and punish the wrongdoer, but
to take the place of the juvenile's real parents in shaping his law-
ful development. 10 Moreover, because the courts were not try-
6. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of
Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 169.
7. Id. at 169:
A criminal law based upon [deterrence and retribution] had
failed to suppress crime and was cruel to individuals because of
its failure to individualize treatment. Certainly such a harsh,
poorly conceived system should no longer be applied to children.
See also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
8. For a statement of the parens patriae rationale, see Cinque v.
Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923), where the court notes that the prac-
tice of providing safeguards and care for helpless persons long has been
a part of the common law, probably first exercised by courts of chan-
cery in dealing with minors left without parents or guardians, but with
property of some sort. Since that time English and American courts
have enlarged the scope of their protective care for minors, and legis-
latures have made special provisions for judicial care by enactingjuvenile court acts.
9. Illinois passed its first juvenile court act in 1899. L. 1899 at
131, §§ 1-26. By 1917 similar acts had been passed in all but three
states, U.S. CmiDaRN's BUmEAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON JUVENmE DE-
LIaNQUENCY 7 (1960). Today all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico have similar statutes. NATIONAL CoUNcn. OF JUVENILE COURT
JUDGES, DIRECTORY AND MANUAL 1 (1964).
10. To effectuate the court's role as parens patriae, investigational
and social services were put at its disposal. When a juvenile was
brought before a juvenile court, these services were used to study his
background, environment, personality and education. On the basis of
these studies, a recommendation for treatment would be made to the
court. Justice Douglas commented that
The juvenile court was to be a clinic not a court; the judge
and all of the attendants were to be visualized as white-coated
experts there to supervise, enlighten, and cure-not to punish.
This new agency-which stood in the shoes of the parent
or guardian-was to draw on all the medical, psychological, and
psychiatric knowledge of the day and transform the delinquent.
Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due Process of Law, 19 JUv. CT. JUDGES J.
9-11 (1968). See generally Mack, supra note 7.
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ing the juvenile as a criminal, but merely dealing with him as
parents, juvenile court proceedings were termed "civil" rather
than "criminal." As a consequence, procedural safeguards af-
forded adults as a matter of constitutional right were held in-
applicable and unnecessary in juvenile courts."
Despite high expectations for this system of juvenile adju-
dication,'2 the results of its operation have been less than satis-
factory in two ways. First, the procedural attitudes of juve-
nile court judges have not always been paternal or benevolent.
While speaking in terms of "treatment," courts have neverthe-
less seemed inclined to dispose of juvenile offenders by incar-
ceration in "reform" schools.' 3 Second, it has become apparent
that reform schools are little better for juveniles than prisons. 4
11. See People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); Com-
monwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905). In Fisher, the court
said:
In pressing the objection that the appellant was not taken
into custody by due process of law, the asumption [is] that the
proceedings of [the Juvenile Court] are of a criminal nature....
But ... the constitutional guaranty is that no one charged with
a criminal offense shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. To save a child from becoming a
criminal.... the legislature surely may provide for salvation of
such a child . . . by bringing it into one of the courts of the
state without any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it
to the state's guardianship and protection. The natural parent
needs no process to temporarily deprive his child of its liberty
by confining it in his own home, to save it and to shield it from
the consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness, nor
is the state, when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place
of the father for the same purpose, required to adopt any
process....
213 Pa. at 52-53, 62 A. at 200.
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
13. In his opinion in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), Justice Fortas
noted that the results of the system as practiced
have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history
has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however ben-
evolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and procedure.
Id. at 18. See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966),
quoting from Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System:
Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7:
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern
that the child ... gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment posited
for children.
For further commentary, see Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile
Courts, 46 CoRN. L.Q. 387 (1961); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police,
State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REV. 775 (1966).
14. Handler, supra note 13, at 12-13:
The most blatant discrepancy between theory and practice
probably occurs in the character of the custodial or treatment
institutions. It is charged that most reform schools are little
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Despite these shortcomings, courts have adhered to the notion
that juvenile proceedings are "civil" rather than "criminal" and
have persisted in withholding the procedural rights guaranteed
by the Constitution.' 5 Thus, many due process safeguards have
been consistently denied to juvenile offenders by various
courts.' 6 When procedural rights have been extended to juve-
niles, it has not been on constitutional grounds, but as a matter
of fair treatment.17
more than prisons, dominated by fear and repression. Where
corporal and other degrading punishments are used, the schools
are considerably worse than the average maximum security
prisons.
See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); A. DEUTSCH, OUR REJECTED
CumLDREN (1950); P. TAPPAN, JuvENILE DELINQUENCY 389-471 (1949).
15. E.g., People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932):
"Since the proceeding was not a criminal one, there was neither right to
nor necessity for the procedural safeguards prescribed by constitution
and statute in criminal cases." See also In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C.
App. 1967).
16. Among those rights denied have been: (A) the right to bail:
e.g., In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952); In re
Sharp, 15 Idaho 120. 96 P. 563 (1908). (B) the right to be indicted by the
grand jury: e.g., Garner v. Wood, 188 Ga. 463, 4 S.E.2d 137 (1939);
Childress v. State, 133 Tenn. 121, 179 S.W. 643 (1915). See also Annot., 45
A.L.R. 1533 (1926); 85 A.L.R. 1099 (1933). (C) the right to a speedy and
public trial: In re Sharp, supra; In re Mont, 175 Pa. S.C. 150, 103 A.2d
460 (1954). (D) the right to trial by jury: People v. Anonymous, 56 Misc.
2d 725, 289 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1968); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. S.C.
62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967). But see Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968). (E)
the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt: People v.
Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); Robinson v. State, 204 S.W.2d 981
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947). But see In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328
(1953); People v. Anonymous, 53 Misc. 2d 690, 279 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1967);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946). (F) the right
to remain silent: In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947);
In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); Mill v. Brown, 31
Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (1907). (G) the right to be advised of right to
counsel: In Re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.C. Cir. 1955); People v. Fifield,
136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955); In re Sharp, supra. For a
compilation of cases standing for the proposition that (1) juvenile court
proceedings are civil in nature, and (2) that various safeguards do not
apply to juveniles, see Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-63 (D.C.
Cir. 1959) (Appendices A & B).
17. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932),
where the court held that a juvenile's guilt need not be proved in the
same way as that of an adult. The court in dictum set certain standards:
There must be a reasonably definite charge. The customary
rules of evidence shown by long experience as essential togetting at the truth with reasonable certainty in civil trials must
be adhered to. The finding of fact must rest on the preponder-
ance of evidence .... Hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice,
trends of hostile neighborhood feeling, the hopes and fears of
social workers, are all sources of error and have no more place
in Children's Courts than in any other court.
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In 1966, however, the Supreme Court reviewed a case arising
under the juvenile court statute of the District of Columbia' s
and signalled its dissatisfaction with the treatment of children
in juvenile courts. In that case, Kent v. United States,19 the issue
was whether, under a statute requiring a "full investigation" by
the juvenile court as a condition to certifying a juvenile offender
for trial by the district court,20 a minor's rights had been in-
fringed by the judge's refusal to hold a hearing on the matter and
his failure to allow the minor's counsel to examine the social serv-
ice file. The Supreme Court held that the statute's provisions
for investigation must be read "in the context of constitutional
principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel. 21
Reading the statute in this light, the Court found that it required,
as a condition to valid certification to adult court, provision for a
hearing, access by counsel to social records and probation reports
considered by the court, and a statement of reasons for the
court's decision.2 2 The Court mentioned but did not reach the
constitutional issue of denial of due process.23 This first indi-
cation that certain constitutional rights might be required in
juvenile court systems was carefully tempered, however, by an
affirmation of the value of the special rights and immunities
afforded the juvenile by non-criminal procedure.2 4
Three months after announcing its decision in Kent, the
Court granted certiorari25 to review In re Gault,26 which
squarely presented the question of the applicability of adult
criminal due process rights to juveniles. 27 The Gault Court held
Id. at 177, 183 N.E. at 355. See also Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556,
559 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
18. The current provisions are found in D.C. CODE AxN. § 16-2301
(1961).
19. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
20. D.C. CODE § 11-914, now § 11-1553 (Supp. IV 1965).
21. 383 U.S. at 557.
22. Id.
23. 383 U.S. at 552.
24 The court noted five "special rights and immunities" that the
juvenile courts provide:
(1) protection from publicity and public scrutiny;
(2) confinement separate from adult convicts;
(3) a limit on the maximum sentence (until 21 years of age);
(4) a stated preference for release in the custody of parents; and
(5) exemption from loss of civil rights and from other conse-
quences of an adult conviction. 383 U.S. at 556-57.
25. In re Gault, 384 U.S. 997 (1966).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967), reversing 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
27. The appeal contended that six rights secured by the Constitu-
tion had been denied: (1) notice of the charges; (2) right to counsel;
(3) right to confrontation and cross-examination; (4) privilege against
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that, in delinquency proceedings which could result in incarcer-
ation,28 the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment re-
quires (1) that the child and his parents or guardian be afforded
adequate written notice in advance of the specific charges; (2)
that the child and guardian be apprised of their right to coun-
sel; (3) that the juvenile have a right to confrontation and
cross-examination; and (4) that the juvenile be afforded the
privilege to remain silent.2 9
The Illinois Supreme Court in Urbasek went beyond Gault
by requiring that juveniles be proven guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt.30 Reiterating the rationale of Kent and Gault that
the child may not be benefitting from the present system and
that certain rights are not for adults alone, the court emphasized
the "recurrent theme of the majority in Gault which equated
many aspects of delinquency adjudication with criminal con-
viction."3' It concluded that
[w]hen we eschew legal fictions and adopt a realistic view of
the consequences that attach to a determination of delinquency
and a commitment to a juvenile detention home . .. we can
neither truthfully nor fairly say that such an institution is de-
void of penal characteristics. 32
In light of this conclusion, the Illinois court reasoned that "the
language of the Gault opinion exhibits a spirit that transcends
self-incrimination; (5) right to a transcript of the proceedings; and (6)
right to an appellate review. Id. at 10.
28. The Court specifically excluded from consideration prejudicial
and post-adjudication processes, confining itself to proceedings at
which a "delinquency" determination may result in commitment to a
state institution. Id. at 13.
29. Id. at 33-57. In light of the fact that it was reversing the
Arizona Supreme Court's ruling for the reasons enumerated in the text,
the Supreme Court chose not to rule on two issues urged by the appel-
lants: that Gerald Gault had been denied the right to a transcript of
the proceedings, and that he had been denied the right to appellate
review. Id. at 57-58.
30. In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967). For recent
comments on Urbasek, see Comment, 19 SYRA. L. REv. 1041 (1968); Com-
ment, 17 AMER. U.L. REV. 549 (1968). The Saint Louis University Law
Review has recently published a series of essays and comments dealing
with the lawyer's role in juvenile court proceedings. See King, Training
in Juvenile Delinquency Law: The Saint Louis University Law School
Forum-Clinic, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 597 (1968); Comment, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 603
(1968); Comment, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 631 (1968); Comment, 12 ST. L.U.L.J.
644 (1968); Comment, 12 ST. L.U.L.J. 659 (1968).
31. 38 Ill. at 540, 232 N.E.2d at 719.
32. Id. at 541, 232 N.E.2d at 719-20. The court based this state-
ment on its observation that adjudications of delinquency often result




the specific issues there involved,"33 and that it would not be
constitutionally permissible, as a matter of either due process or
equal protection, to apply a less stringent standard of proof to
juvenile cases than to adult proceedings.3 4 The court expressly
exempted from the scope of its holding juvenile proceedings not
involving the possibility of incarceration.3 5
The right of an accused to have this criminal guilt proved
beyond a reasonable doubt is not guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. It is, however, an "ancient and salutory doctrine"3 6 with
roots preceeding the advent of the common law.3 7 The doctrine
was expressly stated in the common law as early as 1802,31 and
has been a basic precept often codified in state statutes ever
since. 39 Although the Supreme Court has intimated that the
right is of constitutional stature,40 it has not as yet held that the
right is required by the Constitution.41 Thus the Illinois court's
rationale in deciding that it is constitutionally impermissible not
to afford that standard to juveniles is of interest.
Unfortunately, the rationale in Urbasek suffers from the
court's failure to explain clearly the reasons behind its consti-
tutional holding. That holding was based on both the due proc-
ess and equal protection clauses:
We believe ... that the language of Gault exhibits a spirit
that transcends the specific issues there involved, and that, in
view thereof, it would not be consonant with due process or
equal protection to grant allegedly delinquent juveniles the
same procedural rights that protect adults charged with crimes,
while depriving those rights of their full efficacy by allowing a
33. Id. at 541, 232 N.E.2d at 719.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 541, 232 N.E.2d at 720.
36. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 428 (1927) (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
37. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-54 (1895).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 785.3 (1966); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 836
(1961):
'Where there is a reasonable doubt of the defendant being
proven to be guilty, he is entitled to acquittal."
40. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). The Court noted
that where a person is charged with a crime, the prosecution is assigned
the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It then com-
mented that due process requires that no man lose his liberty unless the
government has convinced the fact-finder of his guilt. It might be in-
ferred from this language that the Court felt that due process requires
proof of criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Coffin v.
United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895); Brooks v. United States, 164 F.2d 142,
143 (5th Cir. 1947).
41. See, e.g., Michael & Cunningham, From Gault to Urbasek: For
the Young the Best of Both Worlds, 49 CH. BAR REc. 162, 166 (1968).
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finding of delinquency upon a lesser standard of proof....42
That the court does not pursue this statement further is some-
what mystifying since it is clear that the reason behind the
court's holding is its view that juvenile court adjudications
and criminal convictions result in substantially identical dispo-
sitions. Since such similarity was the factual basis for Gault's
reliance on the Due Process Clause,43 it is curious that the Illinois
court chose not to limit its constitutional holding to that clause.
There may have been two reasons for the court's conduct in
this regard. First, the fact that the Constitution does not ex-
pressly require the reasonable doubt standard, and that the Su-
preme Court has not yet held it to be implied, may have contrib-
uted to the Illinois court's hesitatioa to rely on a single clause.
By citing both provisions the court's rationale stands a better
chance of conforming with future Supreme Court decisions, if
those decisions hold the standard to be constitutionally required.44
A second reason for the opinion's dual reliance may simply be
that the court felt that both clauses supported its holding. Use
of due process was dictated by the court's reliance on Gault,
which was based on that clause. H.owever, the facts cited in
Gault and Urbasek, which led to the conclusion that juvenile
and criminal incarceration are similar, might also compel a hold-
ing that equal protection requires that the guilt of adults and
juveniles be proved to the same degree.45
Because of the widely different ramifications of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, it seems unwise to rely on
42. 38 Ill. 2d at 541, 232 N.E.2d at 719.
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-31 (1967).
44. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a case which
raised an issue of the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard to
juvenile proceedings. In re Whittington, 13 Ohio App. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d
333 (1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 819 (1968). The Court subsequently
vacated per curiam and remanded to the Ohio Court of Appeals for
reconsideration in light of Gault. 391 U.S. 341 (1968).
45. Cf. Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1927), where
the Court stated:
The equal protection clause, like the due process of law
clause, is not susceptible of exact delimitation.... Certain gen-
eral principles, however, have been established . . . In the
first place, it may be said generally that the equal protection
clause means that the rights of all persons must rest upon the
same rule under similar circumstances, [citations omitted] and
that it applies to the exercise of all the powers of the state
which can affect the individual ... [citations omitted].
Id. at 37. It is interesting to note that another post-Gault case which
was decided after Urbasec followed the Urbasek rationale. Santana v.
State, 431 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
[Vol. 53:883
CASE COMMENTS
both for the Urbasek holding.46 Use of the Equal Protection
Clause would imply that juvenile courts must provide all the pro-
tections and procedures of the criminal process regardless of
whether these protections and procedures are constitutionally re-
quired. This result follows because the Equal Protection Clause
demands that persons in similar circumstances be similarly
treated.47 This, in turn, would tend to negate the special rights
and immunities afforded juveniles by the juvenile court system.
The Due Process Clause, on the other hand, provides a more
desirable basis for the Urbasek holding. "Due process" consti-
tutes that fair play which is consonant with our traditional con-
cepts of liberty and justice.48 Its use would not require that
the juvenile system be made identical to the adult system. Thus,
reliance on due process would allow courts to deal selectively
with questions of juvenile rights while maintaining separate ju-
venile procedures. In addition, such an approach would have
conformed precisely to the Supreme Court's rationale in Gault.
Apart from these considerations, courts and commentators
have long differed on the propriety of incursions into juvenile
procedures. It has been argued that modification of the juvenile
court systems would impair the value of the special rights and
immunities afforded juveniles and would nullify the benefits
derived from their non-criminal treatment. 49 On the other hand,
there has been considerable support, both before"0 and after 1
46. The two clauses may, however, overlap with regard to certain
rights, because there are substantial elements of equal protection inher-
ent in the concept of "due process." See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 331-32 (1921); Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Heming, 34 N.J. 144, 165, 167
A.2d 609, 620 (1961) (Proctor, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1927);
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333 (1921).
48. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1953); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1883).
49. See In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. App. 1967). The court in
Wylie held that, because Gault did not consider the issue of the ap-
plicability of the reasonable doubt standard, the court would adhere to
its prior decision in In re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. App. 1964), that
the standard is not constitutionally required. See also Young, Due
Process and the Rights of Children, 18 Juv. CT. JDGES J. 102 (1967).
50. Pre-Gault cases in New York and Virginia held that juveniles
are entitled to have their guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1931); Jones v. Commonwealth,
185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946). A New Jersey case, In re Lewis, 11
N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953), allowed use of the reasonable doubt stand-
ard in a juvenile proceeding when the state had not objected. These
cases did not, however, hold that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt was a constitutional necessity. In re Madik is in opposition to
the later, more fully reasoned case of People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171,
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Gault, for an extension of the reasonable doubt standard to
juvenile proceedings. It is difficult to see how extension of this
standard would impair the benefits sought to be afforded ju-
veniles. Because juvenile proceedings can result in severe cur-
tailment of freedom it seems important to ensure every possible
safeguard. A balancing of interests indicates that the juvenile
should have his guilt proved by more than a preponderance of
the evidence. Some have suggested that a standard of "clear
and convincing proof" be adopted, 52 but the problem of accurately
applying or even defining such a standard seems to outweigh
any benefit its adoption could produce.53
The court in Urbasek did not attempt to go beyond the
single issue before it by outlining a general formula for deter-
mining the scope of juvenile rights. Except for the court's re-
liance on both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses,
this approach is in no way novel si.nce the Supreme Court has
dealt with juvenile rights in the same manner. Thus in Gault
the Court carefully limited its holding to the requirement, as a
matter of due process, of only four specific procedural rights at
the adjudicatory stage of certain juvenile proceedings." This
case-by-case approach allows the judiciary to avoid both exten-
sive policy making and potential interference with the beneficial
183 N.E. 353 (1932), but was not mentioned in that case and therefore
may represent a parallel line of authority in New York. See Com-
ment, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1204 (1967). For the reaction of commentators, see
Polow, The Juvenile Court: Effective Justice or Benevolent Despotism?,
53 A.B.A.J. 31 (1967). Judge Polow comments that:
In view of the great power of the juvenile judge to deprive a
youngster of privileges and freedom, the reasonable doubt test
is appropriate and should be applied.
Id. at 34. See also Note, supra note 13, at 795 nn.109-10.
51. Santana v. State, 432 S.W.2d 558 'Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
52. The Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency so recommended. ADVISORY CouNciL OF JUDGES,
NATIONAL CouNcIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
IN THE JUVENILE COURT 68 (1962). This standard also appears in the
Council's MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS § 26 (Proposed Final Draft,
May, 1968), and the UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT permits either the
reasonable doubt or "clear and convincing evidence" standard, but sug-
gests that Urbasek may not be followed by the Supreme Court. NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFOmV
JUVENILE COURT ACT § 29 (Final Draft, August, 1968) and comment
thereto. See also RULES COMMITTEE OF THE MINNESOTA JUVENILE JUDGES
ASSOCIATION, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THE
MINNESOTA PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS (effective March 1, 1969). The
Minnesota rules provide that the reasonable doubt standard must be
used in delinquency cases. Rule 5-4(b) (i), (ii).
53. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
54. Cf. note 29 supra.
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procedures of the juvenile court system, while permitting it to
compel respect for those rights it feels cannot be denied the ju-
venile offender.
The approach taken by the Supreme Court and roughly fol-
lowed by Urbasek might, however, be criticized as inadequate
because it could inhibit the Court in dealing with the special
nature of juvenile procedures. 55 Gault viewed the juvenile court
acts as creating procedures which differed from those afforded by
criminal law but to which specific criminal guarantees applied.
This could mean that the Court was limiting itself to working
from the "norm"5 7 of adult criminal procedure, thus restricting
its ability to accept or create innovative, non-criminal, but never-
theless "fair" juvenile procedures. The Court would be better
advised to approach the problem by formulating standards con-
cerned with the overall quality of juvenile court procedures,
rather than by basing its decisions on comparisons with the re-
quirements of adult criminal procedure. This would more fully
accord with the intent of juvenile court statutes to provide
non-criminal methods of dealing with juvenile offenders.
On balance, however, this criticism ignores the fact that the
Supreme Court has been concerned with the quality of the pro-
cedure, and has not interfered with the essentially non-criminal
nature of juvenile proceedings. The holding in Gault was care-
fully limited to four crucial rights, thereby leaving the Court
free to deal with future problems as they arise. Moreover, the
Court established certain guidelines which it apparently intends
to observe in applying criminal rights to the juvenile court sys-
tem. These guidelines, which were announced in Kent and re-
iterated in Gault, simply require that juvenile procedure contain
those rights which are in fact essential to fair treatment of ju-
veniles:
We do not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held
must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial
or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold
that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due pro-
cess and fair treatment.58
55. Cf. Welch, Kent v. United States and In re Gault: Two Deci-
sions in Search of a Theory, 19 HAST. L.J. 29 (1968).
56. Id. at 33.
57. Id.
58. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). See also In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 at 31 n.48, where the Court noted:
The problems of pre-adjudication treatment of juveniles, and of
post-adjudication disposition, are unique to the juvenile process;
hence what we hold in this opinion with regard to the proce-
dural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary
applicability to other steps of the juvenile process.
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Urbasek has extended the holding in Gault to require the
proof of a juvenile's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because
the court's rationale recognizes the burdens of incarceration in
"reform schools," and because the standard of proof used in
adjudicatory hearings is a vital element in the process of deter-
mining guilt, it seems clear that the Urbasek holding is correct.
It is only unfortunate that the court in Urbasek chose not to rely
solely on the Due Process Clause; such reliance would have
avoided the possible unfavorable ramifications of the present
decision.
